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ABSTRACT
This work addresses the effectiveness of energy efficiency (EE) incentive programs in
reducing electricity consumption and assisting states in meeting their energy policy
goals. EE programs provide financial incentives to encourage consumers to make
investments in energy efficient equipment and reduce energy consumption. This study
carries out a quantitative analysis to provide insights into EE programs performance.
In two empirical applications, the research examines program performance on two
levels: national coverage including all US-based utilities in the first application and
state performance in the second application.
The first empirical application examines stipulated energy savings from electric utilities
across all states and compares the outcome to an econometric model that estimates
savings from observed consumption. This study examines panel data from the
contiguous US spanning eleven years from 2005 to 2015, to estimate the effect of EE
program total expenditures on electricity demand. We find that although EE investments
have been effective in reducing energy consumption, the modeled magnitude of these
energy savings implies that EE programs have had a smaller effect on energy
consumption than claimed by electric utilities over the same period.
The results imply a price elasticity of energy efficiency ranging between 0.29 - 0.54;
indicating a rebound effect. Consequentially, energy savings are less than proportional
to the increase in energy efficiency. However, consumers benefit from an increase in
energy services, since they get more of the service, for less cost.

The second empirical application examines the cost-effectiveness of state-specific EE
programs. The application employs econometric analysis to mimic an experimental
research design using observational data from states with different energy policies in
EE investments. This methodology evaluates program performance between states with
aggressive EE policies and states with moderate programs. The differential effect of EE
program implementation (treatment) in those states is examined in the context of a
difference in differences approach and synthetic control method. The study examines
the performance of the state with the highest per capita investments in EE: the state of
Rhode Island.
We assessed the energy efficiency policy of Rhode Island and compared its outcome to
Maine and New Hampshire. Findings suggest that there is not a statistically significant
effect on residential consumption, as a result of the substantial increase in EE
expenditure, in RI during the period 2008 to 2015. However, a re-evaluation of the
Rhode Island EE policy, using the synthetic control method (SCM) identifies that by
the year 2015, annual per-consumer residential electricity consumption in Rhode
Island was 97 kWh (1.34%) lower, on average, than it would have been in the absence
of the increased EE programs.
The research also identifies that energy efficiency improvements have welfare
implications on various levels: individual, local, national and international. The
outcomes from improvements in energy efficiency are not limited to energy savings but
influence a wide range of benefits such as job creation and improved living conditions.
Finally, the research provides insights by comparing the levelized costs of energy
efficiency and renewable energy. We find that the cost of renewable energy production

is now very close to the cost of reducing energy use through energy efficiency programs.
Continuing downward trends in the cost of renewable energy technologies such as solar
and wind may suggest a change in the priorities of states energy incentive programs in
the near future.
However, it is important to note that this comparison only includes the financial cost,
and does not consider the full social cost. For example, this comparison does not
consider other social costs, such as aesthetic effects of large-scale solar energy
facilities, or wildlife impacts of wind turbines.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The heated debate on climate change has led to an increase in environmental research
and the creation of more environmental policies. In recent years, there has been a
growing interest in the literature on energy efficiency (EE). The objective of this
research is to evaluate the effectiveness of EE programs, specifically those that provide
financial incentives to reduce electric energy consumption. The discussion is no longer
solely centered on the scarcity of natural resources for traditional energy production.
The drive for energy efficiency programs and sustainable economic development has
been an energy policy goal in the US, since President Carter’s administration. However,
technological innovations, which were expected to overcome obstacles to future growth
and economic progress, have not been able to keep up with the ever-increasing demand
for energy. The increase in energy consumption, driven primarily by population growth
and increased global wealth, is correlated with rising average atmospheric temperatures.
This has become the center of one of today’s most complex problems. Environmental
economists today are facing the challenge of using economic theory not only as a tool
to explain and understand the utilization of natural resources but as a means to shape a
new relationship between the economy and the environment.
As early as 1975, Wally Broecker, in the Journal of Science, forewarned: “Are we on
the brink of a pronounced global warming?” (Broecker, 1975). Four decades later, the
correlation between carbon emissions and the dangers of global temperature rise, has
increased the international concerns. For example, the UN decided to take action in the
form of a global climate conference. Specifically, at the 2015 United Nations Climate
1

Change Conference in Paris, nations agreed to a drastic reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions in order to limit global temperature increase. The global climate governance
signatories to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change acknowledged the
problem and demanded action. Their actions were driven by good intentions translated
into a new set of universal goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) promoting
energy efficiency and renewable energy programs. However, efficiency and renewable
energy programs require the implementation of energy policies, and their effectiveness
is a subject of controversial debate. Criticism includes the selection bias issue that
reduces the effectiveness of the programs. At the same time, an increase in energy
consumption as a result of the implementation of the programs leads to overestimates
of the energy savings. This topic is examined analytically and described in the research
as the rebound effect.
The target proposed by the climate summit in Paris introduced policies to hold “the
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels" (COP21, 2015). An adjustment of this magnitude requires the
immediate reduction of carbon output. That would translate into immediate and drastic
technological adjustments via a binding and universal agreement by all nations of the
world on specific climate-related policies. In practice, the only two available options to
achieve such an outcome would be a decrease in the overall demand for energy or the
increase in the supply of clean energy, free of greenhouse gas emissions. Governments
around the world have adopted both solutions in varying analogies in the hope of
curbing carbon emissions. The first option, a decrease in energy consumption via
practices and technologies that allow us to maintain the same level of service, is referred
2

in the bibliography as energy efficiency (EE). A typical example of an EE program is
the offer of rebates by utilities to consumers to encourage investments in new EE
technologies and equipment. EE incentive policies have a broad scope and consist of
specific programs like those that target electricity consumption, natural gas and
deliverable fuels (oil, propane). This research focuses on electricity incentive programs.
Currently, policymakers and stakeholders focus on adopting incentive programs to
increase investments in EE. They are hoping that the actual effect of EE programs in
reducing electricity consumption will indeed have a positive effect in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. The relationship between funds spent on EE investments and
corresponding electricity savings is critical because we are unable to make the necessary
technological improvements in the short-term. For the examined period, 2005-2015,
state policymakers have increasingly encouraged utilities to invest public funds in
financial incentives for EE. The annual expense for the year 2015 was more than double
the annual expenditure five years earlier. This trend seems to continue unimpeded;
therefore, questions about the duration and effectiveness of the programs ought to be
examined. In 2015, the total spending for energy efficiency from electricity utility
incentive programs was $5.7 billion (Table 7: Annual Costs of Electricity Efficiency
Program Implementation) (EIA, 2015).
The relationship between actual funds spent in the form of incentives on EE
investments, and the corresponding electricity savings, has not been fully researched
and documented. Policymakers adopt energy efficiency incentive programs because
they are thought to be effective. They are driven by energy policy stemming from public
opinion and the scientific data on global warming. The idea is that the marginal cost of
3

increasing energy efficiency is less than the marginal cost of producing additional
energy. Acceptance of the concept that EE programs are essential drivers for costeffective energy conservation has created a framework where subsidies for EE have
been viewed as an appropriate key strategy. For that reason, states compete to achieve
energy savings by increasing their spending for EE programs each year. This is an
analogical reasoning understanding of the EE impact on energy consumption.
According to this reasoning, similarities between two systems are presumed to support
the conclusion that some further similarity exists. Adopting this reasoning, stakeholders
presume that by increasing spending on EE programs, there will be an analogous
decrease in the demand for energy. This reasoning by analogy approach is dominant in
the energy market. Programs, policies, and expectations, in general, are driven by
assumptions that are based on this concept. This research explores the reasoning by
analogy approach and compares program outcomes using the economic principles
angle.
Therefore, the goal of this study is to examine and evaluate the effectiveness of the
above-mentioned electricity EE programs that provide financial incentives for reducing
overall energy consumption in the contiguous US for a period of eleven years examining
data on 3,745 utilities. The quantitative task is difficult and tedious because of the size
of the dataset examined. However, the importance of the study justifies the challenge.
A better understanding of the mechanism of financial incentives will help state energy
policy-makers to be more effective. The focus is on the economics, and not the driving
politics, to identify precisely how subsidies and EE programs result in reducing energy
demand, specifically in the case of electricity consumption. It is also essential to develop
4

a comparative understanding of the energy policies related to renewable energy (RE)
generation. As the cost of RE decreases and the cost of EE progresses, there is a tipping
point where the two technologies will be competitive. It is also important to understand
the temporal cost of EE and if there are economies of scales in the implementation. The
contemporary analysis, introduced in this research, provides better insights on how
public funds must be spent to optimize results. Governments and market leaders can
utilize available economic tools to significantly increase the effectiveness of
technological developments in the fields of renewable energy (RE) generation and
energy efficiency (EE) technologies. The target is to reduce the amount of greenhouse
gases emitted into the atmosphere, and both EE and RE can contribute significantly
towards this goal. The new energy equilibrium will be a result of simultaneous changes
in technological innovations in RE production and behavioral changes using EE.
Understanding the relationship between financial incentive programs and energy
investments will uncover a path for sustainable development.
The energy savings that are the product of EE programs are reported by utilities and the
magnitude of the savings reported essentially defines the unit cost. To achieve additional
savings, the trend has been to increase subsidies continually. A better understanding of
the practical results of the mechanism of subsidies will assist governments in adopting
appropriate policies that would balance the negative externalities of fossil fuels with
sustainable economic growth and prosperity via the better use of new technologies and
methodologies. Economic theory identifies reasons that the savings from utilities are
lower than utilities expect and report. This research identifies and describes the barriers
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that reduce the expected savings and increase the cost of EE. The empirical application
quantifies this discrepancy and examines different EE policies.
There are known barriers when evaluating the cost-effectiveness of EE programs for
electricity. This is because a substantial amount of errors may occur, due to
inconsistencies across utility companies, specifically on how they measure energy
savings and adjust estimates for free riders or spillover effects. Additionally, electricity
energy savings based on engineering models typically don’t capture changes in
consumer behavior, and as a result, tend to overstate energy savings due to not
considering the rebound effect. Any evaluation, therefore, should take under account
free riders and the rebound effect both of which increase the cost of EE.
This study examines the reported electricity savings from utilities and compares their
magnitude to econometric models of electricity demand. The objective is to understand
if the obstacles identified from literature result in different than expected outcomes in
energy savings. The expectations of EE programs are enormous. Based on the annual
reports that administrators of energy efficiency programs submit to the Energy
Information Administration (EIA), savings from electricity efficiency programs from
2005 to 2015 have reduced total electricity sales across the nation by about 1%.
Investments in energy efficiency do contribute to the solution to climate change by
steering the energy market in the right direction. This paper, however, assesses if the
magnitude of the effectiveness of investments in energy efficiency meets the reported
quantities. Understanding the effectiveness of EE programs will help shape future
decisions.

6

In the literature review, we summarize the role of the energy efficiency programs since
they were first introduced and describe the economic theory underlined in the research.
In the methodology chapter, there is an analysis of the quantitative econometric methods
involved to evaluate the effectiveness of the EE programs. The Research Findings
chapter provides estimates of the cost-effectiveness of EE programs and examines the
hypothesis that energy efficiency programs are a predictor of energy consumption.
Additionally, a comparative analysis examines EE programs with a different magnitude
in programmatic costs to evaluate effectiveness. In the Conclusion, there is a discussion
related to the EE incentive programs and policy implications. Finally, the Figures and
Tables chapter presents quantitative supporting material for the research.

7

Chapter 2. Literature review
This study examines the effectiveness of energy efficiency subsidy programs
specifically for the electricity market. The following literature review examines this
and reviews the related conceptual framework. The concepts of energy efficiency in
general and energy efficiency for the electricity market, are reviewed chronologically
as they first emerged along with the correlating scientific and socioeconomic events
that drove relevant public policy. It is also depicted that despite the high amounts of
funding dedicated on these subsidies, the published data on the effectiveness of energy
subsidy programs using observational data rather than reported data is scarce hence
documenting the importance of this study. In addition, it is exhibited that in the
published research there is no explicit universal model that allows governments to
calculate, compare and contrast savings accrued as a direct result of efficiency
programs. In the cases where so-called undisputable savings are claimed, the true
drivers of those gains for different end uses are also not clear. For example, some of
the published or expected gains from these energy efficiency programs do not take
under consideration the rebound effect or take-back effect; a well-established
phenomenon in economics that paradoxically reduces gains due to behavioral or other
systemic responses. These responses, in published past cases of expected gains from
the adoption of new technologies, have limited or even completely offset the expected
benefits.
Historically, EE programs appear to have been put in place because of a combination
of scientific data and public opinion pressures regarding environmental concerns.
These concerns have primarily been focused on the idea that greenhouse gas emissions
8

and their environmental impacts could reach a tipping point that would present a clear
and present danger to global economic growth and prosperity. Over a span of four
decades, researchers, experts, and theorists came to the realization that climate change
is a severe threat, so great, it must be addressed jointly by the international
community.
The literature review chapter is partitioned into two sections; the historical background
and the theoretical framework. The historical background reviews literature that
follows depicts, compares, contrasts, and analyzes the following: how EE programs
came to be in the first place; the energy gap; regulation policies; and the paradox of
energy efficiency improvements and how their effectiveness has been determined in
the published bibliography. The theoretical framework introduces concepts, in
economic principles, as to why improvements in efficiency may differ from expected
energy conservation results.

2.1 Historical Background
2.1.1 Energy efficiency programs defined
According to the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), energy
efficiency (EE) programs target a reduction in energy demand by offering financial
incentives for investments in new, clean and more efficient equipment and technologies.
EE programs have always offered subsidies to consumers to upgrade appliances, heating
and cooling equipment, building envelopes. They have also aimed at long-term
behavioral change, through education. The ultimate objective is to reduce energy
9

consumption, which in turn reduces dependency on the fossil fuels that produce
greenhouse gas emissions and lead to climate change. It is only during the past few years
that EE programs have been developed as stand-alone programs. Initially, EE programs
were part of the demand side management programs (DSM) which are designed to
encourage consumers to modify their pattern and level of electricity consumption. The
historical evolution of these programs sheds light on their importance and the contextual
socioeconomic circumstances under which they were conceived and implemented in the
first place.

2.1.2 Energy efficiency and conservation
It is necessary to highlight the distinction between EE and energy conservation and to
define more analytically the term efficiency. Energy conservation is generally defined
as a reduction in the total amount of energy consumed. Energy conservation may or
may not be achieved with the implementation of EE investments. This distinction is
critical in understanding issues such as the "rebound and backfire effect", described in
this chapter, whereby the demand for energy may increase in response to EE
investments, because of a decrease in the cost of energy supply. Also, energy
conservation implies a behavioral change to save energy that doesn't necessarily
includes investments in equipment. Then again, EE is a synonym to improvements in
equipment and technology that use energy. Efficiency in energy is typically defined as
the energy services provided per unit of energy input. In lighting applications, for
example, efficiency is the ratio of luminous flux to power, measured in lumens per
10

watt. As the index of efficiency increases (ratio of units of service to energy units) it is
implied that per unit of input, we have better service, an improvement in illumination.
As a result, investments in EE technologies will produce the same or better service for
the same amount of energy input.

2.1.3 Specification for energy efficiency programs
The industry assesses the effectiveness of EE programs by using engineer-derived
stipulated estimates. For example, in the case where someone purchases an LED fixture,
it is estimated that there will be savings of 30 kWh per year for a period of 15 years.
This example describes the situation where a consumer will purchase and replace an
incandescent light bulb of 60 watts with an LED of 10 watts and will operate it for 600
hours annually. The replacement will generate savings of 50 watt-hours for every hour
of operation or 30 kWh annually.
In order to increase the market penetration of the new efficient lighting technology, the
EE program will subsidize the price of the LED to lower the purchase price and increase
the number of efficient light bulbs sold. The same mechanism applies to many types of
heating and cooling equipment, electronic devices, water heaters, home appliances and
building materials.
The process just described has a clear rational but may suffer from a number of
assumptions that produce unrealistic expectations. Selection bias is the principal
economic concern related to subsidies (Hartman, 1988). Selection bias arises from the
fact that treated individuals differ from the non-treated for a reason or reasons other than
11

treatment status. In the case of EE programs, there is a concern that the group of
consumers that make EE investments is not representative of the general public. In other
words, subsidies - the treatment to increase EE investments - may benefit higher income
populations instead of benefiting everyone (Herring, 2006).
In addition to selection bias, the spillover effect could potentially increase the effect of
an EE program. Spillover refers to energy savings produced by decisions beyond those
directly associated with participating in an EE program. Conceptually, spillover can be
achieved by both participants and non-participants (Violette & Rathbun, 2014).
Participant spillover occurs when consumers choose to implement additional EE
investments after having participated in an EE program. Non-participation spillover
occurs when energy savings are realized by consumers that implement EE measures
without having participated in a particular EE program.

2.1.4 Brief history of energy efficiency programs
The idea of a viable perpetually growing economy has always been appealing to many.
Although, the consequences of exponential growth, when resources are finite, has been
clearly expressed in cornerstone works like ‘The Limits to Growth’, a report for the
Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Meadows, Meadows, Randers,
& Behrens, 1972). In the book, the authors proclaimed in the early 70s “if the present
growth trends continue unchanged, the limits of growth on this planet will be reached
sometime within the next hundred years.” (p. 23). This seminal work which dealt with
factors that limited human economic and population growth predicted that the economy
12

would probably collapse some time before the end of 20th century. At the time it was
published, such predictions were criticized as dystopic science fiction. Clearly, the belief
in a perpetually growing economy and the need for clean energy, energy efficiency, and
sustainability had not yet entered the mainstream as an essential field of study in the
early 70's. A drastic change appeared in the mid 70's when the concepts of energy
efficiency and demand response programs appeared heavily in the literature. In the
bibliography, they are referred to by the term Demand Side Management (DSM)
programs. They were developed following the October 1973 oil embargo by the
members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (Gellings, 1985).
The crisis that followed that embargo, combined with the following 1973–74 stock
market crash, was considered the most devastating event on the U.S. economy since the
Great Depression (Perron, 1988). Public opinion at the time was a significant
determinant for policy change aimed at energy conservation and strategic fuel
independence. Typically, DSM programs were subsidized with a small percentage of
total revenue from customers, around 2-3% in successful implementations and
sometimes received funding from the state or federal government (Geller, 2004).
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, DSM programs consisted of
the “planning, implementing, and monitoring activities of electric utilities which are
designed to encourage consumers to modify their level and pattern of electricity usage.”
The EIA issued reports on them up to the year 2000, and the primary objective of most
DSM programs was to provide cost-effective solutions in the energy market. DSM
programs promoted behavioral changes that helped defer the need for new sources of
power, including generating facilities, and transmission and distribution capacity
13

additions. They had focused on decreasing energy consumption and shifting demand to
off-peak times, such as nighttime and weekends. In any case, environmental goals were
not the objective for these forms of energy-efficiency programs that were first
introduced in the 1970s.

2.1.5 Utilities and regulation policy
Utilities have a long history of operation. Thomas Edison opened the first public
electricity company in early 1882. A steam-powered electricity generation station at
Holborn Viaduct in London supplied the local consumers with electric light. Edison
used the method of direct current (DC) to supply electricity. The DC method is
constrained in its range of service, and power stations had to be within a mile of the
consumers. Later the same year, in September 1882 in New York, Thomas Edison
opened the Pearl Street Power Station (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001).
Utilities for many decades operated as monopolies. When the New York Stock
Exchange crashed in 1929, the US entered the Great Depression, and many electric
companies across the nation collapsed. In 1935, Congress passed the Public Utilities
Holding Company Act (PUHCA) to prevent unfair practices in the energy sector.
PUHCA was the government’s first attempt to regulate the energy industry. The
regulation limited utilities' operations to a single state and thus made them subject to
effective state regulation. Before the introduction of the regulation, in 1932, the eight
largest utilities controlled 73% of the investor-owned electricity market (Hyman, 1988).
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Following the 1973 energy crisis, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policy
Act (PURPA) in 1978, with the expectation that this bill would reduce US dependency
on foreign fossil fuels. This legislation was part of the National Energy Act, designed to
promote energy conservation and increase investments in renewable-energy supplies by
establishing a program for small hydroelectric power projects (Pub.L.95-617, 1978).
The policy was designed to diversify the US power supply and encourage energy
conservation. This would be accomplished via regulations that required utilities to
purchase power from new producers when their own supply was low. It was the
administration of President Carter that started to emphasize the importance of energy
investments for sustainable development. Making energy policy a top priority, he signed
PURPA in an effort to remedy the energy crisis. PURPA restructured the energy market
and encouraged energy efficiency and hydropower investments. President Carter
associated the energy crisis in one of his speeches with the “moral equivalent of war”
(Bennet, 2006) and pointed out that energy efficiency was the “quickest, cheapest, most
practical source of energy” (Bennett, 2006 p.462). According to President Carter’s
philosophy on energy issues, government involvement must promote energy policies in
the way that David Freeman (Freeman, 1974) and Amory Lovins (Lovins, 1976)
advocate. Both David Freeman and Amory Lovins indicated that America’s energy
needs could be more easily met by investing in technologies and equipment that use less
energy to perform the same tasks as less efficient appliances and methods. Since the
days of the Carter administration, all the following US presidents have supported energy
policies that target both the demand and supply aspects of the energy market. Energy
programs continued to encourage behavior change in energy demand, such as using less
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energy and shifting consumption to off-peak periods like nighttime and weekends
(Darby, 2006). Following the second oil crisis of 1979, which drove demand for more
fuel-efficient automobiles, more and more economists were studying energy
consumption and behavior to a great extent to determine overall efficiency and savings.
Stemming from independent research, and based on the well-known phenomenon
known as the Jevons Paradox, economists Leonard Brookes and Daniel Khazzoom
(Saunders, 1992) concluded that increased energy efficiency paradoxically tends to lead
to increased energy consumption. They conducted their research on the fuel efficiency
that was achieved for automobiles on average, while overall consumption had continued
to increase.

2.1.6 The energy efficiency gap
The idea of an energy efficiency gap and the market barriers to energy efficiency
investments was part of the literature in the 70s. Literature, including the IEA, identifies
the difference between observed and optimal investments in EE, as the energy efficiency
gap.
The concept of energy efficiency as a policy strategy was developed by Lovins who
supported investments that will use less energy to produce greater economic output
(Lovins, 1976). Later this decade, it was suggested that when selecting durable goods,
consumers trade off capital cost and energy cost as if they heavily discount future energy
savings (Hausman, 1979) (Train, 1988). The failure of consumers to make energysaving investments that have a positive net present value is the core concept explored
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by economic literature according to the EE gap. The same consumer behavior is
observed in the vehicle market where consumers undervalue future fuel savings (Allcott
& Wozny, 2014) (Helfand & Wolverton, 2009). These studies suggest that the way
consumers make decisions about energy efficiency investments leads to lower spending
on energy-efficient products that would be expected if consumers made all positive net
present value investments. This behavior has come to be known as the energy efficiency
gap. However, the energy efficiency gap concept has been met with skepticism. The use
of analyses showing investments in energy-saving technologies that appear profitable
from a net present value perspective has caused even more skepticism (Soest & Bulte,
2001). Many economists question the regularity of the decision-making models, and the
cost assumptions stated to identify the existence of underinvestment in energy
efficiency. Some researchers have stated that the energy efficiency gap has been used as
political justification for intervention in energy efficiency markets through efficiency
tax credits and other subsidies and claim that empirical evidence for a significant energy
efficiency gap is limited (Allcott & Greenstone, 2012). On the other hand, the literature
in energy economics has long identified that market failures can lead to low levels of
investments in energy efficiency. Lack of information, environmental externalities, and
principle-agent issues can drive EE investment to suboptimal levels (Gillingham &
Palmer, 2014). Recently, economists explain the energy efficiency gap as a result of
systematic behavioral biases in consumer behavior (Allcott, Mullainathan, & Taubinsky,
2014).
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2.1.7 Sustainable development
As stated, a gradual progression in the research from energy independence to topics like
environmental awareness and later to that of climate change have become increasingly
relevant to the topic of energy efficiency and renewable energy. There have been
discussions that go as far as 200 hundred years ago regarding the impact of civilization
on the environment since the time of demographer, political economist and country
pastor Thomas Robert Malthus (Rogers, Jalal, & Boyd, 2012). However, it was not until
the mid-70s that that applied examples of this conceptual progression became a practice
with programs like property tax incentives for the purchase of residential solar
technology. These incentives programs involved two states in 1974, twenty-eight states
in 1976 and increased to forty-four states by 1981 (Hinds, 1981). The same period, we
have the introduction of DSM programs offered by electric utilities. DSM programs
started modestly in the 1970s as a response to the increasing concerns about dependence
on foreign fossil fuels. The programmatic cost increased rapidly during the late 1980s
with the introduction of incentive programs for utilities to pursue least-cost or integrated
resource planning principles (Eto, 1996). In 1987, the notion of sustainable development
emerged in the literature in the modern sense with the publication of the Brundtland
report by the UN World Commission on Environmental and Development (Keeble,
1988). Scientists began to research and understand that environmental concerns like
stratospheric ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity and acid rain were international and
required a transboundary response. On the other hand, there was a disincentive to any
change because utilities’ gross income was stemmed by the throughput incentive: a
contribution to gross income that occurred with every energy unit due to the fact that
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the unit variable price recovered some of a utility’s fixed costs (Morgan, 2013). In the
mid-80s it became apparent that a government regulated separation of a utility’s
revenues from its unit sales and profit volumes was necessary; a sort of "decoupling."
Electric utility DSM programs peaked in 1993, spending $2.7 billion or about one
percent of U.S. utility revenues.

2.1.8 Decoupling
A regulatory tool that effectively disassociated the utility's profits from its sales of the
energy commodity became known as "decoupling." It is the mechanism that disrupts the
alignment of the rate of return with meeting revenue targets and encourages firms to
nudge consumers toward reducing energy use and adopting energy efficiency programs
themselves. This indifference to sales and focus on energy efficiency changed the
overall utility environment forever. Since then, the utility's revenue from fixed costs has
remained at levels regulators determine to be fair and reasonable while the financial risk
for the utility decreases. Decoupling has been recognized as a win-win strategy to both
utility companies and the environment by actively encouraging energy efficiency
because it ensures that a utility still recovers short-run fixed costs if consumption
declines as a result of carbon reduction policies (Shirley, Lazar, & Weston, 2008).

2.1.9 Climate change and energy efficiency
In the early 1990s, the literature began to broaden its attention to include global
environmental issues such as global warming and climate change (Bergh, 2016).
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However, it is only after the change of the millennium that US EE programs increased
the incentives for electricity and natural gas investments significantly.

COST OF ELECTRICITY AND NATURAL
GAS EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS
Electricity programs

Natural gas programs

$1.4
$1.0

$1.1

$1.4

$1.1

$0.9

$0.3

$0.3

$0.6

$0.8

$3.1
$2.2 $2.6
$1.8 $1.2
$1.0 $0.9 $1.0 $1.1 $1.4 $1.4 $1.6

$3.9

$4.7 $4.8 $5.0

$5.9 $6.3

Figure 1: Electricity and natural gas efficiency programs ($ million)
Note. Data for electricity and natural gas efficiency programs in the United States
from the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy: State scorecard 2016

2.1.10 Deregulation policies
Deregulation means that the generation process in the electricity market will be open
to competition; however, the transmission and distribution of the electricity market
will remain a regulated monopoly. The market openness in electricity generation
provides customers a choice of how they purchase and use electricity.
Deregulation policies play a crucial role when examining the ownership status of
electric utilities because they signify whether the utilities are directly regulated by the
government, which affects the administration of energy-efficiency programs
(Blumstein, Goldman, & Barbose, 2005). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) introduced Orders 888, 889, and 2000, which allowed all power producers fair
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access to transmission lines for safe and reliable power (Sioshansi, 2001). These
regulations essentially broke up integrated utilities by forcing them either to sell their
power plants to a third party or, transfer them to an unregulated affiliate. To address
concerns about reliability and safety of the shared power grid, regulators decided to
empower two groups: the regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and the
independent system operators (ISOs). This legacy instituted by FERC is in place
today, and the two groups monitor and control the operation of the power grid across
most regions of the US (Tomain, 2002).

Figure 2: Deregulated energy - States and markets
Note: Map was reprinted from an Eisenbach Consulting LLC article in the
ElectricChoice.com website
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2.1.11 Energy efficiency programs and global temperature
Publications of the findings on greenhouse gas emissions and the ever-rising average
global temperature fueled public concerns regarding greenhouse emissions. In 2003,
British prime minister Tony Blair and Swedish prime minister Göran Persson sent a
joint letter to the European Commission (Ruda, 2003). They urged that if a government's
fundamental goal is to promote economic growth and prosperity, it had to be combined
with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions with a "decoupling" of economic growth
from its environmental impacts. In his speech on sustainable development, Mr. Blair
said, "It is clear that Kyoto is not radical enough." Once again, the concept of energy
efficiency was employed and was being called to accomplish increasingly diverse goals.
At 2015, United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, policymakers otherwise
reluctant to implement climate policies fueled by renewed public interest legislated the
reduction of energy demand by investing in clean, more efficient, non-greenhouse gas
emitting equipment and technologies. For a second-time governments were driven by
external factors: global warming statistics and public outcry. The pledge to drastically
reduce greenhouse gas emissions via behavioral change through education alone is by
definition a long-term goal. In contrast, the tool immediately available to governments
to achieve the 2015 Climate Change Conference goals was the adoption of specific
energy efficiency (EE) programs propagated by subsidies as part of a new
comprehensive climate policy framework. As a result, during the past few years, EE
programs have developed as stand-alone programs separate from the demand response
(DR) programs. As program budgets increased, EE and DR programs were developed
in parallel but followed distinct paths. In EE programs’ development, electricity utilities
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often play the role of the administrators with state governments mostly playing the role
of regulator. They are perceived as successful programs with a twofold gain: offering
both environmental and economic benefits. Many states have broadly adopted the
current objectives of EE programs, and in 2015, State-supported System Benefit
Charges (SBC) used to generate funds for electric EE programs via a per kWh charge
on electric bills reached 1% of total electricity revenues. Of course, there is a wide range
in SBC collections with the states of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Vermont leading
the nation with EE program spending equating to more than 6% of their state's electricity
revenues. Concerning monetary burden, in Rhode Island for example, in 2015, the
annual cost per residential household associated with EE's System Benefit Charge
(SBC) was $73. At the same time, other states have more moderate programs and many
states that don't support energy efficiency programs at all.

2.1.12 The role of incentives in energy efficiency programs
Policymakers have identified energy efficiency as a means of combating the rising costs of
energy, energy shortages, and climate change. Thus, incentives to encourage energy
efficiency were established. Investing in programs for energy efficiency may help accelerate
the adoption of innovative technologies and encourage investments in energy efficiency.
Consequently, EE programs can lead to a reduction in the growth of energy consumption.
The timing of energy efficiency implementation is critical. Financial incentives can
contribute to consumers investing in energy efficiency earlier than they otherwise would
have (Gillingham, Rapson, & Wagner, 2015).
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A theoretical model of a private energy efficiency investment is illustrated in Figure 3:.
Given the initial marginal cost MC, the optimum quantity of investment in EE is 𝑄1. Offering
financial incentives on EE decreases the marginal cost of the investment. The new optimum
quantity is 𝑄2 . At this level of EE investments, individuals that would have invested at the
initial unsubsidized level 𝑄1will benefit from the incentives (free riders).
Energy efficiency programs are about efficiency change; getting people to adapt existing
technologies, such as LED lights, that use less electricity. EE investments can be
implemented at any time, and financial incentives may accelerate implementation. We can
reasonably expect all consumers to replace inefficient technologies, eventually. The
consumers with investments in EE=𝑄2 should be thought of as the consumers induced to
invest in more efficient technologies due to offered financial incentives at time t, who
otherwise would have invested in energy efficiency at some future time (t+n). The objective
of accelerating the deployment of energy efficiency can be achieved with a number of
different programs and policies. As mentioned above, the focus of this proposed research is
to assess the effectiveness of financial incentive programs for energy efficiency. In addition
to these programs, states support other initiatives such as building energy code enhancements
and compliance, transportation policies, appliances and equipment standards, and State
government “lead by example programs” as conventional methods of reducing energy
consumption. However, utility incentive programs remain the flagship of this effort.
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MC

Price

Subsidized MC

𝑃1

A
B

𝑃2
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𝑄1

𝑄2

Number of adopters

Figure 3: Subsidized marginal cost and free riding

Note. The figure demonstrates an increase in EE investments when the marginal cost
decreases with subsidies. Given the initial marginal cost, the optimal level of
investments in EE is 𝑸𝟏 . In the case that an energy efficiency program offers financial
incentives and the marginal cost of this investment decreases, the new optimal is 𝑸𝟐 .
The level 𝑸𝟏 of investments in EE would have been implemented even without the
provided financial incentives (free riding).
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2.1.13 Energy efficiency programs for the electricity market
EE programs are developed in both the electricity and natural gas markets. This thesis
narrows the investigation of EE programs to the electricity market, but some perspective
is necessary. Electricity programs and natural gas programs are distinct due to different
targets and budgets. Electric EE programs have been implemented for decades while
natural gas programs only just gained a notable presence after 2006 (Figure 1:
Electricity and natural gas efficiency programs ($ million). Regarding the magnitude
of their budgets, electric EE programs are much larger with about five times the budgets
of natural gas programs. The electric EE programs across the nation target all aspects of
economic activity from the residential sector to commercial, industrial and
transportation. The electric EE programs are sophisticated and target appliances,
lighting and HVAC systems by offering solutions that will decrease consumption while
providing the same or better level of service. It is worth mention that during the last few
years the US has experienced a revolution in EE lighting solutions with the introduction
of light-emitting diode (LED) technologies in all lighting applications (indoors and
outdoors). Lighting accounts for about 7% of the total US electricity consumption (EIA,
2016) and LED technology has the potential to reduce this consumption by more than
30%.
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2.1.14 Energy efficiency programs and effectiveness
In theory, efficiency is measured by the quantity of output divided by the quantity of
energy input. Traditionally efficient technologies have had a higher upfront cost, but the
promise was that eventually money and energy would be saved. The utilities also faced
the challenge of mounting investment costs of new generation environmentally friendly
but high-cost power plants just to meet the ever-rising demand. They too had an interest,
therefore, in energy efficiency as a resource to decrease capital investments while
meeting electricity demand (Geller, 2004). Concerning the cost-effectiveness of EE
electricity programs, there is controversy found within the literature. Estimates of the
cost-effectiveness of EE programs range from $0.01 to $0.22 per kWh saved.
Gillingham et al. (2004) estimate the cost of incentive programs at $0.039 per kWh.
Friedrich et al. (2009) used utility and state evaluations for 14 states to estimate an
average cost to utilities of $0.025 per kWh saved. Loughran and Kulick (2004)
examined panel data on 324 utilities, between 1989 and 1999, and reported an average
cost of $0.06 - $0.22 per kWh. Auffhammer, Blumstein, and Fowlie (2008) examined
the same period and estimated the cost of energy savings $0.01 - $0.08 per kWh.
Arimura et al. (2012) evaluated ratepayer-funded DSM expenditures between 1992 and
2006 and estimated expected average cost to utilities of roughly $0.05 per kWh.

2.1.15 Rebound effect and energy efficiency programs
Researchers have questioned the assumption that consumers require the same level of
energy services before and after an efficiency investment. The discussion of evaluation
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of EE programs has focused on concepts that distort program effectiveness and are
associated with an increased demand of electricity over time when the cost for the
commodity drops with the implementation of EE. This effect is well documented in the
growing literature as the “rebound effect” and results in decreased energy savings after
EE improvements are implemented. Empirical estimates of the effect were documented
in many studies. A paper focused entirely on residential energy savings in countries that
are members of the organization for economic co-operation and development (OECD)
estimated the direct rebound effect at 30% (Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, & Sommerville,
2009). Empirical evidence from Austria identify the rebound effect for space heating
between 20-30% (Haas & Biermayr, 2000). The estimated rebound effect can differ
widely depending on the application (lighting, appliances, building envelop, HVAC),
the place and the time of the study. Even more substantial rebound effects that reached
80% were found in the US residential sector over the period from 1995 to 2011. This
indicates that policymakers should be aware that the expected energy savings from
efficiency improvements may not be achieved (Orea, Llorca, & Filippini, 2015).

2.1.16 Evaluation, measurement and verification (EM&V) of EE programs
The practice to evaluate, measure and verify energy-efficiency programs goes back to
1970s and early 1980s and was conducted by federal entities like the US Department of
Energy’s Weatherization Assistance Program and by State Energy Programs (Vine, Hall,
Keating, Kushler, & Prahl, 2010). EM&V is the collection of methods and processes to
assess the energy savings expected from the implementation of energy efficiency
28

measures. The goal is to identify and achieved results with greater certainty and
accuracy so that future programs can be more effective. Practically, EM&V process
quantifies the benefits of EE as a cost-effective, reliable resource.
Based on the experience in the US, the most important and transferable technical issues
are "net savings" (incrementality), evaluation of market transformation programs, and
evaluation of the carbon impacts of energy-efficiency programs. Of these, the most
significant technical issue is the evaluation of net energy savings (versus gross energy
savings). According to a background paper for subsidies in the energy sector, the
European Union does not use a consistent evaluation method for EE programs for each
member country (Bacon, Ley, & Kojima, 2010). The picture is similar in US and EM&V
is evolving along with the of EE programs. Some states provide leadership with their
regulatory framework. California and Massachusetts are identified as the principal states
in the EM&V framework (Nowak, Molina, & Kushler, 2017).
According to a study prepared by the ACEEE (Nowak, Molina, & Kushler, 2017), the
three topics with essential developments in the EM&V process are the: technical
reference manuals (TRM), the common practice baselines (CPBs), and the advanced
metering-based M&V. The TRM is a classification of EE measures that outlines the
expected energy savings either through deemed savings values or engineering
algorithms. The CPBs are energy consumption estimates of what a typical end-user
would have done and are used as the basis for baseline energy usage. Lastly, advanced
metering describes the measurement and verification methodology that use available
energy data and incorporate data analytics to improve effectiveness.
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2.2 Theoretical Framework
Investments in Energy Efficiency (EE) address energy challenges by reducing energy
demand. The core idea is that such investments are cost-effective. Furthermore, EE is
often treated as a source of energy supply because it can displace electricity generation.
For that reason, EE supporters compare the EE marginal cost of saving energy to the
marginal cost of producing energy and argue that the energy savings from customer EE
programs are typically achieved at a lower cost than the cost of new generation of energy
(Yang & Yu, 2015). Additionally, energy generation almost always involves
environmental impacts, even in the case of wind and solar generation. Reducing
demand can also reduce the need to transmission capacity and reduce peak demand. For
this reason, in the literature, EE is described as "first fuel."
Acceptance of the concept that EE programs are essential drivers for cost-effective
energy conservation has created a framework where subsidies for EE have been viewed
as a critical strategy. For that reason, states compete to achieve energy savings by
increasing their spending for EE programs each year. This is an "analogical reasoning"
understanding of the EE impact on energy consumption. Stakeholders believe that by
increasing spending on EE programs, there will be an analogous decrease in demand for
energy. This "reasoning by analogy" approach is dominant in the energy market.
Programs, policies, and expectations, in general, are driven by assumptions that are
based on this concept.
This research provides a rigorous economic analysis based on economic principles to
examine the potential role of efficiency in meeting energy demand. The chapter
introduces the economic theory to understand consumer behavior regarding energy use
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and energy efficiency better. Analytically, the theory explores the rebound effect from
principles in consumer theory and derives the welfare implications of the rebound effect.
As already mentioned, in the distinction between EE and energy conservation, energy
conservation may or may not be achieved with the implementation of EE investments.
This distinction is critical in understanding issues such as the "rebound and backfire
effect," described in this chapter, whereby the demand for energy may actually increase
in response to EE investments, as a result of a decrease in the cost of energy supply.
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2.2.1 Microeconomic theory - Electricity demand
This section provides a theoretical framework to explain, in economic principles, why
improvements in efficiency may have different than expected energy conservation
results. The core idea is that the benefits to a consumer (or a producer) of energy services
due to the implementation of an EE investment would essentially come down to a price
reduction in energy. According to microeconomic theory, this price reduction will drive
two effects: an own-price effect and indirect effects of income changes. The first-order
effect will most probably reduce the energy savings. The reduced cost of energy services
will increase disposable income. Economic agents with improved purchasing power will
then increase their expenditure on other commodities, including appliances or services
that require energy consumption. The first-order effect of this expenditure would likely
increase the quantity demanded energy services, and partially offset energy savings.
In other words, initially, an increase in energy efficiency will reduce the cost of energy
services. The law of demand suggests that this will likely increase the demand for energy
services. An example of this is an increase in fuel efficiency in automobiles which
reduces the cost per mile of driving, leading to an increase in miles driven.
Second, this reduction in the price of energy services leads to an effective increase in
disposable income. If energy services are a normal good, this will also increase the
quantity demanded
The Slutsky equation (below) demonstrates that the change in the demand for a service
that is an outcome of a price change, is the result of two effects; a substitution effect and
an income effect.
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𝜕𝑥𝑖 (𝑝, 𝑤) 𝜕ℎ𝑖 (𝑝, 𝑢) 𝜕𝑥𝑖 (𝑝, 𝑤)
=
−
𝑥𝑗 (𝑝, 𝑤)
𝜕𝜌𝑗
𝜕𝜌𝑗
𝜕𝑤
Where ℎ𝑖 (𝑝, 𝑢) is the Hicksian demand and 𝑥𝑖 (𝑝, 𝑤) is the Marshallian demand, at price
levels p, income level w, and fixed utility level u. The right side of the equation is equal
to the change in demand for a service i, as a result of a price p change, holding utility
fixed at u; minus the quantity of service j demanded, multiplied by the change in
demand for service i, when income w changes.
Hicksian demand ℎ𝑖 (𝑝, 𝑢) is consumer’s demand for a bundle of goods and services that
minimizes the expenditure at a fixed level of utility u. Marshallian demand 𝑥𝑖 (𝑝, 𝑤)
shows the relationship between the price of a service and the quantity demanded. The
analysis that follows rests on neo-classic economic assumptions. Economic agents have
rational preferences between outcomes, consumers maximize utility and producers
maximize profits and all agents act independently on the basis of full and relevant
information.

2.2.2 The consumer of energy services
Economic theory is based on the assumption that a household, or any entity acting as a
consumer, will maximize utility subject to an income constraint. Consumer’s
preferences can be implicitly described by a utility function u(x,𝑠1 , 𝑠2 ), where energy
services are denoted 𝑠𝑖 and non-energy commodities as x. In the utility function, we
consider two energy services, 𝑠1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠2 where 𝑠2 encompasses all energy services
besides 𝑠1 . A simplified form of the model would have a one-to-one relationship
between energy services and fuels, such that each fuel is used for a single service and
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each service can be obtained from a single fuel. In addition to this assumption, there
would not be any changes in income from investments in efficiency. However,
Borenstein (2015) shows in his analysis that as EE investments decrease disposable
income, the magnitude of the rebound effect is reduced.
The consumer’s model is derived where energy services 𝑠𝑖 are provided through the
consumption of fuels j=1, 2 at the price 𝑝𝑗 . Efficiency (𝜂𝑖𝑗 ) is used to produce energy
service 𝑠𝑖 that is obtained by fuel j at the fuel cost of 𝑝𝑗 with the corresponding fuel
consumption of 𝑓𝑖𝑗 . The consumer has disposable income w. Numeraire good x has its
price normalized to unity. The consumer’s problem therefore is given by:
max 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠1 , 𝑠2 )

𝑥,𝑠1 ,𝑠2

subject to 𝑠1 = 𝜂11 𝑓11
𝑠2 = 𝜂22 𝑓22

w = x + 𝑝1 𝑓11 + 𝑝2 𝑓22

The solution to the utility maximization problem yields the demand for energy services,
denoted 𝑠𝑖∗ (𝜂11 , 𝜂22 , 𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑤). The demand for energy that maximizes consumer’s
utility can conveniently be rewritten as 𝑠𝑖∗ (𝜋1 , 𝜋2 , 𝑤), where 𝜋𝑖 =

𝑝𝑖
𝜂𝑖𝑖

is the implicit

price of the service 𝑠𝑖∗ . The corresponding fuel consumption of 𝑓𝑖𝑖∗ (𝜋, 𝑤) = 𝑠𝑖∗ (𝜋, 𝑤) /
𝜂𝑖𝑖 .
As energy efficiency for service i=1 changes, with an improvement of 𝜂11 , the
comparative statics obtained, show how changes in energy services and fuel demand
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impact (decreased) the implicit price of energy services. With an increase in efficiency,
we get the following comparative statics:

𝜕𝑠1∗
𝑝1 𝜕𝑠1∗
= −
(𝜂11 )2 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝜂11

(1)

∗
𝜕𝑓11
1
𝑝1 𝜕𝑠1∗
∗
= −
(𝑠 +
)
(𝜂11 )2 1 𝜂11 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝜂11

(2)

∗
𝜕𝑠2∗
𝜕𝑓22
𝑝1 𝜕𝑠2∗
= 𝜂2
= −
(𝜂11 )2 𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝜂11
𝜕𝜂11

(3)

2.2.3 Direct rebound effect
Following the previous notation, an increase in energy efficiency, 𝜂11 , would affect fuel
consumption 𝑓11 from additional use of energy services, due to the decrease in the price
of usage 𝜋1 . The direct effect is typically defined in terms of elasticities. Elasticity of
demand for a with respect to b (𝜀𝑎,𝑏 ) describes the direct rebound effect as 𝜀𝑓11 ,𝜂11 + 1
or equivalently, 𝜀𝑠1 ,𝜂11 .
Energy prices influence consumer’s decisions regarding the consumption of energy. As
energy prices change, the elasticity of demand for energy would result in different
consumer behaviors. If the elasticity of demand for the service is zero, 𝜀𝑠1 ,𝜂11 = 0, the
direct rebound effect would be zero. Equivalently, if the elasticity of demand for the
service is -1, 𝜀𝑓11 ,𝜂11 = - 1, the entire increase in energy efficiency will be realized as a
decrease in fuel consumption. The consumer purchases no more of the service when its
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price falls, and the naïve view of energy saving prevails. For example, doubling gas
mileage means consumer uses half as much gasoline.
In contrast, if 𝜀𝑠1 ,𝜂11 = 1, then we expect a 100% direct rebound effect. The consumer
has 𝜀𝑓11 ,𝜂11 = 0, and there is not any fuel saving from efficiency improvements. The
consumer uses exactly the same amount of energy, but gets more service. The price per
mile decreases by 50%, but the consumer now drives twice as many miles. There is no
reduction in energy use, but the consumer benefits by getting more service. In the case
of a greater than 100% rebound effect, i.e., the elasticity is greater than 1, then the
‘backfire effect’ occurs. More energy is used when energy efficiency increases.
If elasticity falls between zero and -1, the consumer purchases more of the service, but
the net effect is less energy is used, and the consumer gets more of the service. For
example, if efficiency doubles gas mileage, the price per mile is 50% of what it was. At
the lower price, the consumer might drive 50% more miles than previously, while using
25% less gasoline.
Gillingham et al. (2009) provide a summary of previous studies of the estimates of
energy own-price elasticities in both the short and long run. It is clear that the influence
of energy own-price elasticities in the short run is lower in absolute value than in the
long run. Dahl (1993) provides estimates for short-run residential electricity own-price
elasticity ranging between 0.14 and 0.44. Bernstein & Griffin (2005), and Hsing (1994)
provide long-run estimates for price elasticity related to residential electricity in the
0.32-1.89 range. Those values describe a situation where consumers, in the short run,
may increase energy consumption as the cost of energy drops and as cost reduction
maintains - in the long run - further increase consumption.
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2.2.4 Indirect rebound effect
The indirect rebound effect occurs when there is an increase in energy consumption
from the consumption of other energy services when efficiency 𝜂11 improves. The
indirect rebound effect is due to the income and substitution effect on all the other
energy services 𝑠2 . It can be defined as the direct rebound effect, in terms of elasticities,
as 𝜀𝑓22 ,𝜂11 or equivalently, 𝜀𝑠2 ,𝜂11 . Energy services 𝑠2 will increase with an increase in
efficiency 𝜂11 if 𝑠2 is a complement service for 𝑠1 . Respectively, energy service 𝑠2 will
decrease with an increase in efficiency 𝜂11 if energy service 𝑠2 is a substitute service
for 𝑠1 . The indirect rebound effect is challenging to estimate and has received
considerably less attention in the empirical literature.

2.2.5 Total rebound effect
Let’s assume that the utility function is modeled only by the quantity of energy service,
s, and non-energy service, x. A consumer would allocate disposable income between x
and 𝑠 in order to maximize utility. The associated utility maximization problem
is max 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠). An indifference curve would represent all bundles of (x,s) that yield the
𝑥,𝑠

same utility. In the consumer’s utility maximization model, the rebound effect is an
outcome of the following process. As technological innovation improves efficiency, the
relative cost of the service provided decreases. For example, efficient lighting decreases
the cost of operation. Illumination would be consumed in lower per unit price. As a
result, a consumer chooses a new optimal bundle, consistent to the new relative prices.
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The change in the price of energy services has two effects on the demand of service.
The service becomes cheaper relative to other goods which leads to a substitution effect.
Secondly, the disposable income increases leading to an income effect. The magnitude
of the rebound effect is related to the price elasticity of the service. Consumer disposes
the available income in two commodities or services, x and 𝑠, conditional on the initial
prices of 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑠𝐴 . The consumer maximizes utility 𝑈𝐴 at given prices and income
constraints, as described in

Figure 4: Consumer’s total rebound effect.
Let’s assume that 𝑠𝐵 represents energy services of an equipment that has improved and
become more energy efficient. As a result, the cost of energy services has decreased. If
a consumer had to spend all available income on commodity x, they could still buy the
same amount. However, if a consumer had to spend all disposable income on service 𝑠,
they could buy more of the services.
Under the new decreased cost for energy services, 𝑠, 𝑎 consumer will move the optimal
choice from point A to point B and shift the bundle of choices to a new indifference
curve, with a higher level of utility. The consumer will increase energy consumption
from 𝑠𝐴 to 𝑠𝐵 .
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Figure 4: Consumer’s total rebound effect
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2.2.6 The producer of energy services
Typically, investments in EE involves spending more initial capital and achieving
lower future energy operating costs. The initial investment cost is the difference
between the purchase of a more efficient product and the cost of a conventional
product, that provides the same services but requires a larger input of energy. The
decision of whether it is preferable to invest in EE requires an assessment, in present
values, of the initial cost of investments and expected future savings. However,
comparing expected future energy expenditures to initial investment cost is a rather
complex process. Expectations and assumptions must be stated in relation to future
energy prices, discounting rates for future cash flows, changes to operation costs, the
intensity of operation, and finally, a product’s lifecycle. The decision for optimal
investments in EE would minimize the present value of costs. This is described in the
framework of a production function (Figure 5) where initial capital and energy
consumption are viewed as inputs into the production of energy services.
An isoquant represents all factor combinations that are capable of producing the same
level of output. Along an isoquant, the producer would be indifferent between
combinations of input of capital (K) and energy (E). The cost-minimizing level of
energy use is found at the point of tangency, where the marginal increase in capital
cost, with respect to energy reduction, is equal to their relative price, in present-value
terms. Producers of energy services may move along the energy-service isoquant by
substituting capital for energy, in response to a change in relative prices. In those
terms, isoquants are similar to indifferent curves of the theory of consumer’s behavior.
Figure 1 illustrates an example where relative prices change from 𝑃0 to 𝑃1 . Both
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production choices provide the same units of outputs. However, as the producer moves
from 𝑃0 to 𝑃1 , the cost allocation between capital and energy changes. At 𝑃1 , the
producer invests additional resources in the initial capital with an expectation to
decrease energy costs.
As technology improves, the ‘new’ production function may shift the isoquant in a
way favoring higher levels of EE. This is illustrated in figure6 where new production
possibilities, available for the producer, are given in the isoquant 1. Typically, a lower
isoquant would indicate a lower level of output. However, this is not the case with
isoquant 1. Advances in technology make capital more energy efficient. Therefore,
given the same amount of capital, less energy is needed to produce the initial output
level.
This transition to a more efficient capital investment, is described in figure 7. As
technology improves and innovative products enter the marketplace, the isoquant 0
shifts to the left. Initially, at isoquant 0, the producer minimizes costs at (𝐸0 , 𝐾0 ).
After the efficiency improvement in capital investments, the producer may achieve
energy conservation by moving from 𝐸0 to 𝐸1 . This however isn’t an optimal
decision choice for the producer. Realizing the benefits of the new production
combination, the producer will eventually replace capital for energy because energy
has become cheaper. The rebound effect is equal to 𝐸2 - 𝐸1 .
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Figure 5: Producer’s initial capital and energy consumption
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Figure 6: Producer’s improved capital and energy consumption
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Figure 7: Producer’s new capital and energy consumption
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Energy (E)

2.2.7 Welfare implications of the rebound effect
The welfare implications of the rebound effect are analytically discussed in the
academic literature (Chan & Gillingham, 2015) (Borenstein, 2013) (Saunders & Tsao,
2012) (Gillingham & Palmer, 2014) (Otto, Kaiser, & Arnold, 2014). This section gives
a brief summary of the theoretical conditions under which the rebound effect can be
beneficial or undesirable. The analysis provided supports the basic economic concept
that overall welfare is conditional on the relative costs and benefits of the additional
service provided.
Using the notation already defined in the section of the direct rebound effect (2.2.3),
the social welfare (sW) is defined as the aggregate utility used from the economic
agents while accounting for negative externalities:
The social welfare is sW = 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑠1 , 𝑠2 ) – ExC (4)
ExC represents the total externalities from the additional usage of energy services, and
costs are given by ExC = k(𝑒1 𝑓11 + 𝑒2 𝑓22 + 𝑐1 𝑠1 + 𝑐2 𝑠2 ). Here, k represents the
population of identical consumers, 𝑒𝑖 represents the fuel’s marginal external cost
(e.g., from environmental pollution), and 𝑐𝑖 represents the service’s marginal external
cost (e.g., from traffic congestion).
Expression (4) does not account for the cost of the energy improvements. In case there
is a cost associated with energy efficiency improvements, the net change in social
welfare, on the margin, would be the difference between that cost and expression (4).
Derivatives of the concept described are the following propositions:
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Proposition 1: In the absence of negative external costs, an energy efficiency
improvement necessarily improves social welfare.
Proposition 2: The direct rebound effect may increase or decrease overall welfare.

2.2.8 Welfare implications of energy efficiency improvements
The most commonly examined benefit of energy efficiency programs is a reduction in
energy use. We assume that when doubling the efficacy of a lighting system, only half
as much electricity is required to provide the same level of illumination. From this
perspective, a less-than-proportional reduction in energy use is viewed as a failure of
programs to increase energy efficiency.
However, it is often overlooked that an increase in energy efficiency can elicit changes
in consumer's behavior such that an increase in energy efficiency does not lead to a
proportional reduction in energy consumption.
This perspective ignores the fact that increasing energy efficiency also reduces the
effective cost of energy services, which could elicit a behavioral response. For
example, doubling automobile fuel mileage reduces the cost per mile traveled, and
unless the price elasticity demand for automobile travel is zero, we can expect that
more miles will be driven. A downward sloping demand for energy services implies
this rebound effect. With the rebound effect, energy use is reduced less than in
proportion to the increase in efficiency. However, there is also an increase in the
energy services which also must be considered to be a social benefit.
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Consider the example of replacing High-Pressure Sodium (HPS) highway lights with
LED lighting in Rhode Island. LED lights provide an equivalent level of light while
consuming 40-80% less electricity. In this specific example, the Rhode Island
Department of Transportation, in cooperation with the RI Office of Energy Resources,
chose a solution that lead to energy savings of 47%. This solution maintained, and in
many cases, improved the previous levels of highway lighting. The improvement also
implies that the energy investment in new lighting reduced 47% the effective energy
"price" of providing highway lighting. Given the new lower effective price of lighting,
the agency (RIDOT) might choose to improve highway safety by lighting previously
dark sections of highways. In fact, soon after the completion of the lighting project in
2017, RIDOT decided to increase the hours of operation for the highway lighting. In
the past, several areas of the road network were under a lighting ‘curfew’ between
1:00 AM and 5:00 AM. Realizing the benefits of the reduced operating cost, RIDOT
removed the curfew.
For purposes of this example, suppose the agency increased highway safety by
increasing the hours highway lights were on by 32%. The change in hours of
operation implies that the amount of electricity consumed is reduced by 30% = (1-(10.47)*(1.32)) while simultaneously increasing public safety by providing better
highway lighting. In this example, the rebound effect implies that electricity use is
reduced less than proportional to the increase in energy efficiency (30% rather than
47%), but society also benefits from improved highway safety.
Therefore, the presence of a rebound effect does not imply a failure of energy
efficiency programs, but rather it determines the extent to which social benefits are
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allocated among energy savings vs. increased energy services supplied. To properly
evaluate the welfare effects of increases in energy efficiency, one needs to consider
both energy savings and societal benefits from increased energy services.
Determining the sign of the ultimate welfare effect can be complex as it depends on the
relative sizes of the values of energy services, fuel savings, and any external effects,
such as pollution emissions and impacts on traffic. In some cases, such as automobile
efficiency, external effects may be substantial, while in others such as highway lighting,
external effects may be fairly small. But in general, many of these effects are difficult
to quantify and express in monetary terms.
The most fundamental measurement when debating the merits of EE improvement in
electricity, spurred by efficiency programs, is whether the rebound effect cancels the
overall expected welfare implications. The question that arises next is: Why not conduct
an analysis of energy efficiency policies by first examining the cost of the EE programs
and then compare the net benefits including the rebound to the net gains? This is a valid
question because as previously described in this study, net benefits of electricity EE
programs such as expected energy savings may not be fully realized due to rebound
effects. But as articles such as that of (Azevedo, 2014) have shown “There is still
significant ambiguity about how the rebound effect should be defined, how we can
measure it, and how we can characterize its uncertainty” (p.1). Other similar studies,
with analogous findings, have contributed to increasing negative perceptions that these
rebound effects may have. These results may influence decisions on future energy
policies regarding EE programs. When there are large energy service externalities, as a
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result of the rebound, the social welfare is more likely to decrease with an improvement
in energy efficiency. One classic example is traffic congestion in city centers.
In the case that the direct rebound effect and external costs of service are large, the
energy efficiency improvements are more likely to decrease social welfare.
Respectively, when the direct rebound effect and externalities are small, the energy
efficiency improvements are more likely to increase social welfare. When this occurs
and energy consumption increases, welfare may improve only if the consumer surplus
from energy service consumption is greatly valuable (Chan & Gillingham, 2015).
Despite such offsets, all findings that may affect policymakers’ decisions to support new
electricity energy efficiency policies must be evaluated in the general context of social
welfare. In this context, it must be examined to what extent electricity EE improvements
and their multiple goals are indirectly contributing positively to the overall welfare. For
example, unlike the results of rebound effects in the case of the development and
adoption of fuel-efficient automobiles, which increase the amount of miles driven and
therefore traffic and accidents, electricity efficiency improvements such as public
lighting, heating and air-conditioning lack such externalities (Alfawzan & Gasim,
2017). In recent publications, increasing importance has been given to the theory that
EE programs have a fundamental impact on what is called multiple benefits outcomes
that contribute to welfare-enhancing macroeconomic benefits. Depending on the
magnitude of the rebound effect, these implications on social welfare fuel the human
ambition to improve welfare and wealth (IEA, 2014). Nevertheless, the attempt to
quantify the benefits and costs of the rebound effect in order to estimate their impact on
the welfare implications of energy efficiency is very complicated. Researchers such as
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Chan & Gillingham (2015), point out that the exact mechanism of how rebound
influences the welfare implications of energy efficiency has “not been addressed in the
literature” (p.25). There is a need for reasonable real-world estimates that take into
consideration environmental externalities. According to the literature, quantifying
environmental externalities is extremely difficult even when trying to access the welfare
implications of the direct rebound effect in the driving habits of fuel-efficient
automobiles (Parry & Small, 2005). For the purposes of this study, a brief description
of four fundamental welfare implications is examined: energy security, health benefits,
asset values, and disposable income.

Energy security
In the literature review of this thesis, the concept of energy security was introduced as
a precursor to fundamental policy changes that lead to the dawn of EE programs for
electricity. Today there is a modern concept of energy security that involves climate
change and lays out the basic conditions for human prosperity. Some researchers like
Gracceva & Zeniewski, (2014) claim that energy security is a product of the interactions
and interdependencies of a complex system (Gracceva & Zeniewski, 2014). Gallagher
& Appenzeller state that the energy system complexities are such ‘‘whose properties are
not fully explained by an understanding of its component parts’’ (p. 89). Energy security,
therefore, is a product of many diverse attributes, but some researchers like Ecofys
(2009) have provided a three-tier categorization scheme: Extreme events, inadequate
market structures, and supply shortfall. Out of the three categories of energy security
risks as defined by Ecofys (2009), the latter two are well within EE program planning.
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When EE improvements are well thought, they promote liberalization of generation
resources that in turn create well-functioning, distortion-free electricity markets.
Integrated power grids are also responsible for bringing to the consumer the best use of
generation resources. It could be argued that even this improvement of supply stemmed
from competition and increased customer choice may even provide resources for the
first of the three categories of energy security risks mentioned above: Extreme events.

Health benefits
According to a study prepared by the Energy Efficiency Unit, Directorate for
Sustainable Policy and Technology, of the International Energy Agency (IEA), there are
well-documented benefits such as improved health and well-being (IEA, 2014). These
benefits range from reduced respiratory disease symptoms to mental health impacts such
as anxiety, stress, and depression. The worry alone about physical health well-being
affects the overall health of citizens. More and better public lighting, for example,
generates indirect positive social impacts that in turn reduce spending on public health
budgets.

Asset values
High energy costs in the EU have prompted via European Union directives a multitude
of electricity EE programs that were in turn eagerly adopted by consumers. Today, each
building must display a plaque reporting the energy proficiency score. The properties
that were made more efficient gained in value significantly. Respectively, similar trends
are beginning to appear in the U.S. where an increase in property values. There is
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evidence that EE has a positive effect on both the sales and rental prices of properties
(Hyland, Ronan, & Lyons, 2013).

Disposable income
It has been well documented that EE electricity programs benefit households that have
access to a wider energy efficiency increase. According to Azevedo, (2014): If the
energy efficiency measure being pursued saves money to the consumers over its
lifetime, this means the consumer would actually experience a net increase in income.
She might then use some of that income to increase her consumption of that same energy
service, but the rest of it will be spent on other goods and services (or allocated to
savings for future consumption). Some of these goods and services may have large
energy or carbon footprint, whereas others will not (p. 6). However, in many (but not
all) cases, more energy efficient appliances require a higher up-front investment, so
there is a tradeoff between the cost of the appliance vs. energy use. But energy star
appliances will typically be more expensive to purchase. Low-income individuals are
likely to be at a disadvantage in the cases of higher upfront costs, even when energy
saving pay off in the long run.
To reduce consumer expenditure of saved income on goods and services that have large
energy or carbon footprint future energy efficiency policies could be drafted in such a
way that would target decision making, for example, the offering of discounts on
specific items such as more EE technologies.
The conclusion is that we know for a fact that EE improvements have a cost and
consumption changes that can be both adding to the overall welfare or reducing the
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overall welfare. The impact of energy efficiency produces outcome at different levels of
the economy. An investment takes place initially at the individual level in a household
or in an enterprise. However, the outcome of EE impacts the economy as a whole.
Targeted decisions at the individual level, as an outcome of EE incentive programs, may
trigger developments in the local economy. Any future findings from research are bound
to have important implications for policymakers.

53

Chapter 3. Methodology
This chapter presents the methods used to analyze two empirical applications that
examine energy efficiency (EE) incentive programs and concludes with the presentation
of the methodology of the levelized cost of electricity and the datasets used.
The methodology analyzing the first empirical application was designed to examine the
effectiveness of stated versus observed electricity savings, at the national level (US), as
a result of EE incentive programs. The methodology of the second empirical application
examines how an aggressive EE incentive program performs in comparison to moderate
EE programs when implemented at the state level. A comparison between the
methodologies of DiD and SCM is also employed. This chapter also presents the
datasets used in the analysis and a brief presentation of the energy profile of the states
used. Finally, the levelized cost of electricity is presented to provide a measure of
comparison between the cost of renewable energy electricity supply and the cost of EE
conservation.
3.1 First Empirical Application – National level analysis
The methodology of the first empirical application compares stipulated and observed
energy savings due to the implementation of E.E. programs, at the national level. To
identify whether there are discrepancies in the magnitude of the energy savings, that
influence the cost of energy efficiency, the study aggregates the reported costs and
savings of EE programs at the national level and estimates the weighted average cost
of every unit of electricity saved. The reported values from this methodology represent
the estimates that utilities provide using the analogical reasoning methodology to
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evaluate the impact in electricity consumption, using the engineering estimates of their
programs.
As introduced in the theoretical framework section, the concept of analogical reasoning
is utilized to explain the expectation that increasing spending on EE programs will
deliver an analogous increase in energy savings. The reasoning by analogy approach is
dominant in the energy market today and drives programs, policies, and expectations.
In order to evaluate the validity of the reasoning by analogy approach, this research also
assesses energy savings from the first economic principles angle, based on observed
energy consumption.
3.1.1 Data sources of first empirical level
The data used for this empirical application are a collection of three large groups of
time series. Energy data were obtained from the Energy Information Administration
(EIA), demographic data from American Community Survey (ACS) and climate data
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Monthly panel data for energy demand and prices of electricity were collected and
analyzed for a period of eleven years, specifically from 2005 to 2015. Table 1
summarizes the program cost for implementation of EE programs for this period. The
programmatic costs are divided as follows: customer incentives represent 55%, while
other costs, including administrative expenditures, represent 45%. The share of funds
dedicated to customer incentives appears to be increasing over time, which is
encouraging to observe. In other words, the share of benefits provided directly to
consumers in the form of cash payments, subsidies to appliances, energy audits and
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design services has increased in comparison to administrative, marketing, monitoring,
evaluation costs, and utility-earned incentives. Table 2 provides insights into the cost
of the expected incremental, annual savings of EE programs. However, there is no
clear trend of the performance of the programs. The average cost for the examined
period is $0.22 per incremental kWh saved. Some would expect that as program
implementation develops, there would be an increase of the cost per kWh saved, as
low-hanging fruit opportunities become exhausted. This outcome can be interpreted as
an indication that across all states there are still opportunities for cost-effective
investment in EE. Table 3 presents annual electricity total consumption for the same
examined period, 2005 to 2015. Table 4 provides further insights into the distribution
of electricity consumption between the residential, commercial and the industrial
sectors. It is observed that there is a downward trend in the industrial share of
electricity demand across the examined period. The residential sector accounts for the
biggest portion of the total electricity demand during the eleven years (Table 4 and 5).
Table 11 presents nation-wide average electricity prices for the same period in which
the average cost per kWh remains stable at about $0.10. However, in figure 14, it is
observed that demand differs significantly, creating four geographic clusters across the
US.
Efficiency related savings were obtained by the EIA and are part of the information
that electric utilities report via form EIA-861 to the federal government. This form
captures energy efficiency data regarding programs implemented within every state.
More than 700 utilities, representing 1/5 of the total number in the US, implement and
report information related to the results of EE programs. Electricity savings are
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reported annually, for both incremental and total savings. Incremental annual savings,
summarize the expected effect in demand, in terms of MWh for each utility, caused by
new participants in existing programs, and all participants in new programs, during a
given year. Reported incremental savings are annualized to reflect the program
implementation effect if participants had initiated program participation on Jan 1.
Within all programs, during a given year, in addition to the incremental effects, annual
effects are also reported to reflect electricity savings achieved by existing and new
participants. The effect is evaluated based on the start-up dates. For example, if
participation took place on November 1st, only two months of savings are reported and
reflect the useful life cycle of efficiency measures.
Since the year 2013, utilities have also reported life cycle incremental effects. The new
variable reflects the number of years the program is planned to exist and includes all
anticipated future savings, as well as reporting annual savings. For example, if a
project has an anticipated life of 6 years, with savings during each year of 1,000
MWh, the reported incremental life cycle effect will be 6,000 MWh. For the period of
the analysis, we observe that total annual savings are a multiple of the incremental
savings with a multiplier that ranges from 9 to 10.6. This is an indication that
electricity savings succeeded, in any given year, in having a more permanent impact.
The second dataset, demographic data, were collected to control for factors that may
affect energy use. Population, GSP, type of housing, percent of vacant housing units,
and percent of housing units that use electricity for heating. Table 23 presents the
collected demographic variables.
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The third dataset, climate data, were used to control for weather fluctuations. Since
energy consumption depends on weather conditions, degree days were chosen to be
used as the most common indicator to estimate demand for space cooling and heating.
The variation of winter conditions is controlled for by heating degree days (HDD), and
the respectively warm weather is controlled for by cooling degree days (CDD). Both
indicators (HDD and CDD) are defined to a base temperature of 65° F, which is
suitable for human comfort (Rosa, Bianco, Scarpa, & Tagliafico, 2004). Degree days
are the number of degrees in Fahrenheit that deviates from the base temperature
(65°F) as compared to a day’s mean, outside air temperature. The amount of degree
days is proportional to the amount of energy needed to heat or cool a building. The
inclusion of heating and cooling degree days, in this model, as independent variables,
control for weather fluctuation and the estimated coefficients of both variables are
statistically significant.
In addition to the independent variables described above, the model specification in
the regression includes panel fixed effects or each state that controls for climate
differences among states and year fixed effects that capture annual weather trends.
Both HDD and CDD variables are defined in a log-level relationship to the dependent
variable. Energy intensity was logarithmically transformed when degree days are
defined in degree units.
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3.1.2 Modeling electricity saving reported from utilities
There is an extensive number of evaluation reports that estimate costs and electricity
savings as a result of investments in energy efficiency. The U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) is the source of raw data for the majority of the studies. The EIA
reports the performance of the EE programs based on data provided by utility
companies, annually. The EIA is part of the U.S. Department of Energy and is the
principal agency of the U.S. federal statistical system. In order to conduct this
research, raw data from EIA were also utilized. The model is derived from weighted
measures of average savings and costs and those datasets as reported by electric
utilities (EIA Form-861).
This section frames the calculation of savings and costs based on the following
notation. Let n index utilities such as n=1…N. Let t index years such as t=1…T. The
nth electric utility reports savings (S) as a result of program implementation in
t=1…𝑇𝑛 years. However, not all utilities report savings in all 11 years. The same
concept follows the notation for sales (D) and program costs (C). Electricity
consumption that is reported before the utility invests in EE is reported MWh (0) and
after the implementation MWh (1). Electricity savings are 𝑆𝑛𝑡 and 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 =
𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑆𝑛𝑡
To calculate the average per unit costs and savings, a weighted average measure was
introduced following the equations (1) and (2). The results are reported in both
discounted and non-discounted costs.
𝑇

Electricity Savings (S) =

𝑛
∑𝑁
𝑛=1 ∑𝑡=1(𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 )
𝑇

𝑛
∑𝑁
𝑛=1 ∑𝑡=1 𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡
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(1)

𝑇

Energy Efficiency Program Costs (C) =

𝑇

𝑛
∑𝑁
𝑛=1 ∑𝑡=1 𝐶𝑛𝑡

𝑛
∑𝑁
𝑛=1 ∑𝑡=1(𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 )

(2)

Equations (1) and (2) summarize the average weighted savings and costs from n utility
over a period T and can be illustrated using a simple example. Suppose two utilities, A
and B, spend (C) in year t=1, on Energy Efficiency programs, $1 million and $10
million, respectively. One year after implementing the program, utility A reports
electricity savings of 20,000 MWh and sales of 900,000 MWh. Utility B reports
electricity savings of 500,000 MWh and sales of 8,500,000 MWh. Following the
notation described above, utility A: distributed 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1) =900,000 MWh of electricity
instead of 𝑀𝑊ℎ(0) =920,000 MWh.
Accordingly, utility B distributed 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1) =8,500,000 MWh of electricity instead of
𝑀𝑊ℎ(0) =9,000,000 MWh. Based on the example above the estimated percent
savings and costs per savings from utilities A and B are:
Percent electricity Savings (S) =

20,000 𝑀𝑊ℎ+500,000 𝑀𝑊ℎ
11,000,000 𝑀𝑊ℎ

= 4.73%

$1,000,000+$10,000,000

Energy Efficiency Program Costs per Savings (C) = 20,000 𝑀𝑊ℎ+500,000𝑀𝑊ℎ = $21.15
per MWh saved or 2.1 cents per kWh.
The above example is based on the assumption that 𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 is derived from the
observed 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑆𝑛𝑡 .
However, the above calculation which is based on utility stipulated energy savings,
does not control for selection bias as described by Braithwait & Caves (1994) and is a
principal economic concern that relates with subsidies (Hartman, 1988). Selection bias
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arises from the fact that treated individuals differ from non-treated for a reason or
reasons other than treatment status. In addition, this modeling does not account for
increased energy usage as a response to the reduced energy cost; the rebound effect
(Gillingham, Rapson, & Wagner, 2015). Finally, this model omits to compare energy
savings to an unbiased baseline which is essential to draw a meaningful conclusion.
Due to all the above weaknesses, when ex-post assessments evaluate efficiency
programs, the results tend to indicate that programs are constantly underperforming
(Loughran & Kulick, 2004).

3.1.3 Modeling electricity savings using observed electricity consumption
This model assesses observed electricity usage and estimates the impact EE programs
have on the reduction of electricity consumption, based on the econometric analysis. It
evaluates how the observed electricity consumption differs after implementing an
energy efficiency program for the ultimate purpose of assessing energy savings, which
derive from an energy efficiency program. This analysis identifies if there is a solid
ground for skepticism regarding the electricity reported savings and controls for the
limitations described above. The model utilizes an observed, and easy to evaluate
variable, electricity consumption, as a proxy for energy efficiency. However, the level
of consumption without an EE program implemented is not observable. Therefore, it is
necessary to construct an estimate of what the electricity consumption would have
been without the EE program in place. This model forecasts energy consumption
without the EE program in place, controlling for the number of customers, and the
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gross state product (GSP). In the developed econometric model, the dependent
variable is the logarithmic transformation of electricity consumption and can be
explained as energy intensity.
Panel data and fixed effects (FE) are introduced in analyzing the impact of the utility
expenditure for rebates. Fixed effects allow the model to control for variables we
cannot observe, or measure, such as behavioral or cultural, across states; and other
variables that may change over time, but not across states, such as national and federal
regulations. The analysis with FE panel data will also account for individual and
household heterogeneity. The independent variables are the EE program cost, the
energy cost, the average income, other demographics, and temperature in degree days.
The study calculates the impact of utility spending for EE on overall energy
consumption. The changes in electricity consumption are defined as:
𝛥𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑛𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 - 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡−1

(3)

and identified econometrically from specification described in equation (4)
𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 =𝛽1 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽2 + 𝛸𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽3 + 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽3 +𝜇𝑖 +𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(4)

where:
𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 : is the log electricity sales for utility i located in state j in year t
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 : is the log expenditure for EE programs for utility i in state j in year t
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 : number of customers for utility i located in state j in year t
𝛸𝑖𝑗𝑡 : is a vector of utility − level covariates
𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 : is a vector of state − level covariates
𝜇𝑖 , 𝜈𝑡 , 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 : Utility and year fixed effects- and potentially heteroskedastic error term.
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The primary goal is to isolate the impact of EE programs spending on electricity
demand, which is represented by 1 in the equation above. Examining energy
consumption, as the focus for addressing issues surrounding energy efficiency, is not
something new. Studies have provided useful insights, introducing a methodology that
utilizes energy intensity, to examine policies at the state level that have contributed to
energy efficiency (Bernstein et al., 2003; Loughran and Kulick, 2004). Loughran &
Kulick (2004), expanded the framework of Bernstein’s et al., and introduced a more
sophisticated econometric model. They concluded that expenditure for energy
efficiency has a much smaller effect on energy consumption than utilities reported.
The interpretation of 𝛽1 is the effect of energy efficiency programs on electricity
consumption and is the primary objective of this model. In the examined log-log
regression specification of equation (4) the coefficient 𝛽1 is an elasticity.

3.2 Second Empirical Application - State level analysis
The second empirical application examines the cost-effectiveness of state-specific EE
programs. Traditionally, utility’s revenues were completely dependent upon selling
electricity. With decoupling programs discussed above in Section 2.1.8, energy pricing
structures were revised to provide a mechanism for rewarding utilities for helping
bring about energy conservation measures. Energy efficiency has great potential to
meet energy demand at low cost, while simultaneously reducing may externalities,
such as pollution emissions. A proper policy would increase investments in energy
efficiency, starting with the most cost-effective energy efficiency actions, and
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proceeding to increasingly expensive actions until the marginal cost of reducing
energy demand is equal to the cost of producing energy. Thus, the cost-effective
policy is based on identifying the proper balance between reduced energy use and
clean energy production. The second empirical application examines the costeffectiveness of state-specific EE programs. The developed econometric methodology,
for the second empirical application, compares whether there is a statistically
significant difference between the efficiency performance of states with aggressive EE
programs compared to states with moderate programs. For the purposes of this study,
the State of Rhode Island was assessed as the state with the most aggressive EE
program in the US and was compared to the states of New Hampshire and Maine, that
have adopted moderate EE programs.
The differential effect of EE program implementation, also known as the treatment
effect, is examined in the context of two econometric methodologies.
Specifically, the difference in differences (DiD) methodology and the synthetic control
method (SCM) are implemented to evaluate effectiveness. Using the state of Rhode
Island as the treated unit, both methodologies evaluate the impact of aggressive EE
programs. A comparison between the methodologies of DiD and SCM is also
employed to illustrate the methodological advantages of each method. The energy
profile of the three states examined in the second empirical application, Rhode Island,
New Hampshire and Maine, are presented in the following section.
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3.2.1 State energy policy
States strive to provide reliable, cost-effective electricity sustainably. With these
prerequisites in mind, they strive to deliver a safe, uninterrupted energy supply that
meets the environmental standards of the communities they serve. Successful energy
policy needs to promote cost-effective energy resources, to assist the production
process, and enhance the well-being of the public. However, from a policy
perspective, the situation isn’t straightforward because reliable energy isn’t always
clean and clean energy is not always the least costly. Reliable energy supply is the one
that is always available to meet demand needs. However, renewable energy, without
storage, struggles to meet this definition of reliability, with the possible exception of
hydropower. Wind and sun are not available on all days and at all hours of the year. A
combination of renewable energy and energy storage is a promising solution that still
has many limitations, both technological and financial. On the other hand, fossil fuels
are reliable but are not clean, and are themselves finite resources.
The final factor to be consider is the cost. Energy resources are commodities that are
subject to continuous price fluctuations. It is understood that the path to a reliable,
clean, low-cost energy supply is dynamic. Technological and political interactions
continuously affect the energy model for demand and supply.
This section examines EE electricity programs to provide insights into the
expectations of energy policies on the demand side of the electricity market.
To achieve this, as explained previously, the electricity markets examined are in New
England. Specifically, the states of Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Maine. All
three operate under the same wholesale electricity market, the Independent System
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Operator of New England (ISO-NE), which is an independent, nonprofit entity that
serves six states: Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut. ISO-NE’s objective is to administer New England’s wholesale electricity
markets and provide services for reliability planning for the region's electricity system
(ISO, 2017).
The states face very similar wholesale electricity prices, with minor differences
resulting from transmission system conditions, such as line congestion and losses.
Empirically, in this study, it was estimated that the magnitude of the difference in
wholesale electricity prices, is less than 5%, across the three states.
This presentation of the state’s energy profile contributes to the understanding of the
energy efficiency policies that are implemented in the area with the highest electricity
costs in the US. By examining a period of 11 years, from 2005 to 2015, and focusing
on the state with the highest EE program spending in the US per capita, valuable
insights are gained for the policy arena. Lastly, the specification of the methodology
that is designed to examine three periods provides further information about the
temporal performance of the programs.

3.2.2 State of Rhode Island energy profile
The Ocean State is the nation’s smallest state and the second-most densely populated,
after New Jersey. Located in the New England region of the Northeastern United
States, it is the state with the second lowest per capita energy consumption in the
nation, after the state of New York (Table 18: Total Energy Consumed per Capita,
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2015 (million Btu). Rhode Island doesn’t have any fossil fuel resources and is the state
with the first offshore wind turbine installation in the US. The Ocean State’s cuttingedge policies in energy go back to the 1990s. The state developed the first system
benefit fund to lead efforts for demand-side management and renewable energy in
1993. The fund collected over $15 million/year, for energy efficiency, and created a
new market for investments in RI’s energy market. In 2006, the State of Rhode
Island’s General Assembly passed an energy bill known as “The Comprehensive
Energy Conservation, Efficiency, and Affordability Act of 2006”. The law contains an
innovative condition as part of the state’s principal least cost procurement mandate
(R.I.Gen.Law.S39-1-27.7, 2016). According to the law, RI’s approach to meet the
state’s energy needs is to prioritize investments in energy efficiency and energy
conservation measures that are “prudent and reliable and when such measures are
lower than the acquisition of additional supply.”
The Comprehensive Energy Efficiency, Conservation, and Affordability Act of 2006
further transformed the energy efficiency market in Rhode Island. The concept of
Least Cost Procurement (LCP) established new standards in energy efficiency
investment decisions. The new objective is to implement EE investments on an
economic basis rather than placing a cap on investments for budgetary or other
purposes. The criterion for implementing an EE program is that the program be costeffective. The cost-effectiveness is identified simply as the ratio of the net present
value of the benefits to the net present value of the costs. The proposed EE programs,
therefore, must have a cost lower than the cost of the acquisition of additional supply.
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In practice, LCP required Rhode Island’s utilities to invest in cost-effective energy
efficiency that is less expensive than supply. The result is that 10 years later, RI is the
state with the highest reported electricity savings due to EE programs in the nation,
reporting statewide savings of 2.91% as a percent of 2015 retail sales - Table 24. To
achieve these energy savings, RI utilities spent, for electric efficiency programs, $82.9
million in 2015, which represents 6.34% of the statewide electricity revenues. The
proceeds that finance the program are a product of a surcharge that all consumers pay
monthly, through their electric bill. Rhode Island spends a greater proportion of utility
revenues than any other state on EE programs due to the LCP requirements. The
energy efficiency plans are overseen by a stakeholder group, the Energy Efficiency
and Resource Management Council (EERMC), with representatives from government
agencies, environmental groups, businesses, and consumer advocates. The EERMC
was created by the 2006 Act and is charged with the supervision of energy efficiency
programs. It is funded through the billing surcharge and has 13 voluntary
members. The governor, with input from the state Senate, appoints nine voting
members with expertise in areas such as law, the environment, energy codes, and
representatives of end-users. Four additional non-voting members represent the
utilities and the delivered fuels industry. The Commissioner of Rhode Island’s Office
of Energy Resources serves as the EERMC’s Executive Director and Executive
Secretary. SEO staff provides the Council with administrative services. The EERMC
meetings are scheduled monthly and are open to the public.
In addition to the EERMC, a stakeholder body, the Demand Collaborative, provides
consistent and comprehensive contribution into the processes related to the delivery of
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Least Cost Procurement. This group is convened by National Grid, which is the Rhode
Island’s largest utility, to solicit feedback on program plans and implementation
strategies.
The EERMC has funding to retain independent, expert consultants that give technical
assistance to Council members on LCP. The consultants provide research and
recommendations that help the Council in decision-making, program improvement,
and independent verification of the cost-effectiveness of the National Grid’s plans.
Direct Jobs in Energy Efficiency

8,112

Electric Program Expenditures

$84.73 million

Gas Program Expenditures

$21.5 million

Per capita Expenditures

$100.58

Electric Savings

214,512 MWh

Electric Savings as Percent of Retail Sales

2.8%

Gas Savings

4.1 million therms

Gas Savings as Percent of Retail Sales

1.01%

Table 1: Rhode Island EE profile (2015)
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3.2.3 State of New Hampshire energy profile
New Hampshire is a state in the New England region of the northeastern United States
bordered by Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, and the Canadian province of Quebec.
New Hampshire covers an area of 9,351 sq.miles and, as of 2013, has a population of
1.323,459 residents. The average state temperature is 46.3°F and has an annual snowfall
of 61 inches. The state ranks 9th in the heating degree days in the nation (2015, Table
8). New Hampshire has no fossil fuels, petroleum, natural gas, or coal reserves.
The state’s electricity generation is provided as follows: just over 2% by two coal-fired
electric power plants, about 25% by natural gas power-plants and more than 15% by
renewable energy. Almost half of the state’s electricity generation comes from the
Seabrook nuclear plant: the largest nuclear power generating unit in New England. The
plant has a 1,244 MW generating capacity. Despite this output, per capita, residential
petroleum consumption ranks among the highest in the US. This dependence is partially
explained due to the cold winters. New Hampshire is a member of an independent,
non-profit Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) named ISO New England Inc.
(ISO-NE). The ISO-NE corporation oversees the entire New England power system.
The state exports to its neighboring states nearly half of the electricity locally produced.
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Direct Jobs in Energy Efficiency

6,833

Electric Program Expenditures

$25.8 million

Gas Program Expenditures

$7.1 million

Per capita Expenditures

$24.79

Electric Savings

73,499 MWh

Electric Savings as Percent of Retail Sales

0.67%

Gas Savings

2.1 million therms

Gas Savings as Percent of Retail Sales

0.70%

Table 2: New Hampshire EE profile
New Hampshire Energy Efficiency program
In 2005, New Hampshire became one of the seven signatory states of the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The New Hampshire Energy Efficiency program
targets annual savings of 0.49%, of the electricity sales in 2015. The program funding
according to the NH Statewide Energy Efficiency Plan is $26 million and the cost per
lifetime kWh savings is $0.036. The program offered by NH electric utilities is funded
by the System Benefit Charge (SBC), RGGI auction proceeds and revenues obtained by
each of the NH electric utilities from the participation in the ISO-NE’s forward capacity
market (FCM). The SBC is less than 0.2 cents per kWh, five times lower than the SBC
in Rhode Island (1.1 cents).
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3.2.4 State of Maine energy profile
Maine is also located in the New England region bordering only with New Hampshire
in the United States, and the Canadian provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick. Maine
covers an area of 35,385 sq.miles, and as of 2016, has a population of 1,331,479
residents. Three-fifths (60%) of the state’s population lives in rural areas, and it is the
state with the lowest population density in New England. The average state temperature
is 45.65°F and has an annual snowfall of 72 inches (US Climate data, 2017). The state
ranks 6th in the heating degree days in the nation. More than five-sixths of Maine is still
forested, and forest products are a major biomass resource, supplying wood-derived
fuels such as wood pellets. Maine is the most petroleum-dependent state, for home
heating, in New England (EIA, Primary Energy Consumption, 2015).
The state’s electricity generation is provided as follows: Wind produces a little over
12%, hydroelectric dams 25%, and 25% is produced from biomass generators, using
mainly wood waste products. In addition, over 30% of net generation comes from
natural gas. The rest of Maine's net electricity generation comes from petroleum, coal,
and solar power (U.S. EIA, Electric Power Monthly, 2015). Overall, 67% of Maine's net
electricity generation comes from renewable sources. The state does not have fossil fuel
reserves (petroleum, natural gas, coal).
Maine is also a member of ISO New England Inc (ISO-NE). Maine is one of the 12
States that allow combined heat and power as an eligible resource in EERS and
renewable portfolio standard policies (Setting Energy Savings Targets for Utilities,
2011).
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As far as load-serving entities (LSEs), the state of Maine has placed this obligation on
a third-party non-governmental entity (Steinberg & Zinaman, 2014).

Electric Program Expenditures

$45.5 million

Gas Program Expenditures

$1.1 million

Per capita Expenditures

$43.96

Electric Savings

166,500 MWh

Electric Savings as Percent of Retail Sales

1.39%

Gas Savings

148,346 therms

Gas Savings as Percent of Retail Sales

0.14%

Table 3: Maine EE profile
Maine Energy Efficiency program
In 2005, Maine, like New Hampshire, became one of the seven signatory states of the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The Maine Energy Efficiency program
targets annual electric savings of 20%, by 2020, with incremental saving targets of ~
1.6% per year for 2014-2016 and ~2.4%, per year, for 2017-2019. Efficiency Maine
operates under an all cost-effective mandate.
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3.2.5 Difference in differences (DiD) methodology used in the second empirical model
The second empirical application explores whether energy consumption (𝑌𝑖𝑡 ) is
affected by different levels of spending for EE programs (𝐷𝑖𝑡 ). To determine this, the
econometric methodology of the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator was
selected. The DiD is favored when estimating causal effects in empirical economics
because the derived estimations from this research design offer an alternative to reach
unconfounded measures by controlling for unobserved variables and combining it with
observed or complementary characteristics. The DiD integrates the advances of fixed
effects estimators with causal inference analysis when unobserved events, or
characteristics, confound the interpretations (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). According to
Villa (2012), DiD has been used “widely when the evaluation of a given intervention
entails the collection of panel data” (p.2). It is also used even when panel data is not
required, in its simplest version. According to Mora and Reggio (2013), only data
from two periods are needed: “In the first period the pre-treatment period none of the
agents are exposed to the treatment. In the second period, the post-treatment period
those labeled as treated are already exposed to treatment while those labeled as
“controls” are not” (p.2).
As stated by Lechner (2010), the DiD can calculate the results of an EE program
intervention by using “the mean changes of the outcome variables for the nontreated
over time and add them to the mean level of the outcome variable for the treated prior
to treatment to obtain the mean outcome the treated would have experienced if they
had not been subjected to the treatment” (p. 2). In our case, the specific intervention or
treatment is the passage of a law by policymakers to subsidize EE. The model will
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then compare the difference in outcomes before and after the intervention for groups
exposed to the intervention to the same difference in unexposed groups; the control
group.
Card and Krueger’s (1994) study in labor economics is a representative and wellknown paper that demonstrates the DiD methodology. They collected employment
data from fast food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, in February 1992 and
again in November 1992. The minimum wage in Pennsylvania stayed stable over this
period. In New Jersey, the minimum wage increased. They used their data and the
differences-in-differences methodology to estimate the effects of the increase of the
minimum wage in employment. Pennsylvania’s set of observations was used as a
control group to identify the effects of the salary increase in the treatment – the New
Jersey – observations. The idea of using DiD to study the effect of minimum wage
levels on employment was introduced many years prior, by Obenauer and Von Der
Nienburg (1915).
DiD in the empirical application
In this study, the observed value of residential energy consumption is 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and can be
assessed either as a control variable, 𝑌0𝑖𝑡 or a treated variable 𝑌1𝑖𝑡 , depending on the
treatment status. Status 𝑌0𝑖𝑡 represents the non-treatment status for consumers served
by utility (i) in period (t). It describes consumption in utilities with moderate EE
program spending.
The different levels of spending for EE programs (𝐷𝑖𝑡 ) are characterized as moderate
or aggressive. This is a limitation of the method because it is applied to discrete, as
opposed to continuous, levels of treatment. Another limitation is noted by Friedman
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(2013), when referring to the working paper by Mora and Reggio (2013) in a post cowritten by the two explains that: “DiD-as-commonly-practiced implicitly involves
other assumptions instead of Parallel Paths, assumptions perhaps unknown to the
researcher, which may influence the estimate of the treatment effect. These
assumptions concern the dynamics of the outcome of interest, both before and after the
introduction of treatment, and the implications of the particular dynamic specification
for the Parallel Paths assumption.”
Fixed Effects
Electricity consumption (𝑌𝑖𝑡 ) is also subject to fixed confounders 𝐴𝑖 such as behavior
(fixed unit effects) and time varying covariates 𝑿𝒊𝒕 such as income, electricity price
and weather conditions. Term 𝝀𝒕 denotes year effects that are common across all
observations in period t.
E[𝑌0𝑖𝑡 : 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , t] = α +𝜆𝑡 + 𝛢′𝑖 𝛾 +𝛸′𝑖𝑡 β

(1)

Assuming that the causal effect of the status of an EE program is additive and constant
we have:
E[𝑌1𝑖𝑡 : 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , t] = E[𝑌0𝑖𝑡 : 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , t] + ρ

(2)

Together equation (1) and (2) imply that observed residential electricity consumption
in treatment group 𝑌1𝑖𝑡 is:
E[𝑌1𝑖𝑡 : 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , t] = α +𝜆𝑡 +𝝆𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝛢′𝑖 𝛾 +𝛸′𝑖𝑡 β

(3)

Equation (3) implies that:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 +𝜆𝑡 +𝜌𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛸′𝑖𝑡 β +𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4)
Where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌0𝑖𝑡 - E[𝑌0𝑖𝑡 : 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , t] and 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛢′𝑖 𝛾
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Differences in differences is a version of fixed effects estimation. In the case of EE
programs, the notation is:
𝑌1𝑖𝑠𝑡 : Electricity consumption at utilities i, state s, time t, with aggressive EE program
spending
𝑌0𝑖𝑠𝑡 : Electricity consumption at utilities i, state s, time t, with moderate EE program
spending.
However, in practice, we only observe one or the other treatment status. The
assumption is that in the absence of aggressive EE program budget change, energy
consumption is determined by the sum of a time-invariant state effect 𝛾𝑠 , and a year
effect 𝜆𝑡 , that is common across the examined states.
E[𝑌0𝑖𝑠𝑡 |s,t]= 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 (5)
Let 𝐷𝑠𝑡 be a binary (dummy) variable for aggressive EE budget programs and periods.
Assuming E [𝑌1𝑖𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌0𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠, 𝑡] = δ is the treatment effect. Then observed energy
consumption can be written:
𝑌1𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 +δ 𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 (5)
The differences-in-differences strategy amounts to comparing the change in electricity
consumption in areas with aggressive EE program spending, to the change in
electricity consumption in areas with moderate program spending. Electricity
consumption in areas with aggressive EE program spending (AG), before the
implementation of the EE programs is described as:
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝐴𝐺, 𝑡 = 0] = 𝛾𝐴𝐺 + 𝜆0
The electricity consumption in AG after the implementation (t=1) is:
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝐴𝐺, 𝑡 = 1] = 𝛾𝐴𝐺 + 𝜆1 + 𝜹
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The difference between t=0 and t=1 is:
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝐴𝐺, 𝑡 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝐴𝐺, 𝑡 = 0] = 𝝀𝟏 - 𝝀𝟎 + δ
The electricity consumption in areas with moderate EE program spending (MI), is
described as:
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝑀𝐼, 𝑡 = 0] = 𝛾𝑀𝐼 + 𝜆0
The electricity consumption in MI during treatment period (t=1) is:
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝑀𝐼, 𝑡 = 1] = 𝛾𝑀𝐼 + 𝜆1 + 𝜹
The difference between t=0 and t=1 is:
E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝑀𝐼, 𝑡 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠 = 𝑀𝐼, 𝑡 = 0] = 𝝀𝟏 - 𝝀𝟎 + δ
There are two assumptions for unbiased DiD estimation in addition to OLS
requirements:
1. There is a parallel trend in outcomes for both the control and treatment groups.
2. There is no spillover effect.
The parallel trend assumption is critical in the DiD model. It implies that in the
absence of the intervention, both the control and treatment group would have the same
differences in outcomes, over time. Visual observation of the outcomes in the pretreatment period would assist in identifying appropriate control groups. However, this
necessary condition does not indicate that the same trend will continue during or after
the treatment period. Lastly, spillover effects can invalidate the use of the DiD
methodology if the intervention in the treatment group may affect the control group.
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3.2.6 Synthetic control method used in the second empirical model
Both the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) and the difference in differences approach,
as described previously, aim to estimate the treatment effects of policy interventions
that take place at an aggregate level, like a city or a state. While DiD assumes that the
effect of unobserved confounders is constant over time, synthetic control tolerates
confounders changing over time. Synthetic control was originally designed for case
studies and is robust to the unobserved heterogeneity of confounders over time (Kreif,
et al., 2016). The methodology used in synthetic control is to construct a control group
that has similar pre-treatment features to the treated group. The method uses an
optimized weighting procedure to get a better counterfactual for estimating the effect
of an intervention.
The SCM model is specified as follows: Suppose there is one treated unit, i, and n
control units, j (j = 1, 2 … n). We consider a policy intervention with data sampled
both before, and after, treatment. The pre-treatment periods are 𝑡 = 𝑡0 , …, 𝑡𝑘 , and the
post-treatment periods are 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑘+1 , …, 𝑇, so treatment happens between periods 𝑡𝑘
and 𝑡𝑘+1 ,. Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , denote an outcome in t for the treated unit, and let 𝑌𝑗𝑡 denote an
outcome in period t for control unit j. 𝐗 is a vector of predictors (covariates). For i, the
treatment effect, 𝑎𝑖𝑡 , is measured as the difference between its post-treatment
outcome, 𝑌𝑗𝑡 , and its synthetic post-treatment outcome, 𝑌′𝑗𝑡 . 𝑌′𝑗𝑡 is a convex
combination of the post-treatment outcomes of control units, 𝑌𝑗𝑡 , defined by optimized
weights, 𝑤′𝑗 ,:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑡 · 𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛸𝑖𝑡 · 𝛽𝑖 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = {

0, 𝑡 = 𝑡0 , … . . , 𝑡𝑘
(5)
1, 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑘+1 , … , 𝑇
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝛸𝑗𝑡 · 𝛽𝑗 +𝜀𝑗𝑡

𝑌′𝑖𝑡 =∑

𝑛
𝑗=1

and

𝑤′𝑗 · 𝑌𝑗𝑡 = ∑

𝑛
𝑗=1

𝑤′𝑗 · [ 𝛸𝑗𝑡 𝛽𝑗 +𝜀𝑗𝑡 ] (6)

The treatment in the SCM model is the difference between the real treated unit, and its
synthetic version, after the treatment as:
𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌′𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ∑
s.t. 𝑤′𝑗 ≥ 0 and ∑

𝑛
𝑗=1

𝑛
𝑗=1

𝑤′𝑗 · 𝑌𝑗𝑡  t ≥ 𝑡𝑘+1 (7) and

𝑤′𝑗 = 1

The optimized weights, 𝑤′𝑗 , are obtained by minimizing the distance M between 𝚾𝐣 ,
and 𝚾𝐣 · 𝐖𝐣 in the pre-intervention periods, according to:
𝟏

M= min[( 𝚾𝐢 - 𝚾𝐣 · 𝐖𝐣 )'V(𝚾𝐢 − 𝚾𝐣 · 𝐖𝐣 )]𝟐  t ∈ (𝑡𝑜, 𝑡𝑘 )
𝑤𝑗

Where the matrix, V, is positive, definite and chosen to minimize the mean squared
prediction error (MSPE) with respect to pre-treatment outcomes only, conditional on
values of wj∗. This process is what distinguishes SCM from a DiD approach, because
control units are weighted according to the optimized 𝑤𝑗∗ , instead of a simple
weighting of 𝑤𝑗 = 1/𝑁 (Wang, 2015).
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3.2.7 Discussion of the econometric methodologies used in the second empirical
model
The difference-in-differences methodology and the synthetic control method (SCM)
are both used to assess the differential effect of a treatment on a treatment group
versus a control group. In the context of this study, both methodologies evaluate the
effect of a sharp increase of EE programs in energy conservation, at the state level.
Difference-in-differences estimators provide unbiased treatment effect estimates when,
in the absence of treatment, the average outcomes for the treated, and control groups,
would have followed parallel trends, over time. This assumption is implausible in
many settings.
The SCM evaluates treatment effects by constructing a weighted combination of
control units, which represents what the treated group would have occurred in the
absence of the treatment. While DiD estimation assumes that the effects of unobserved
confounders are constant over time, the SCM allows for these effects to change over
time, by re-weighting the control group so that it has similar pre-intervention
characteristics to the treated group (Kreif, et al., 2016).
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3.3 Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) - Comparison
Energy efficiency investments are not implemented in a vacuum. Proponents always
compare the avoided cost of electricity to the cost of generating energy. The objective
is to determine whether energy efficiency investments are cost-effective. This section
provides information about the relative cost of generating electricity using different
technologies. The objective is to develop an understanding of how the cost per unit of
electricity changes over time and more specifically on how energy efficiency
compares to electricity generation from renewable resources.
The most common measure to compare different methods of electricity generation is
the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). The LCOE is the break-even cost of a unit of
electricity in present-value terms, over the lifetime of a generating asset. It is
estimated as the discounted sum of costs over the discounted sum of electricity
produced over the lifetime of the investment:
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

LCOE = 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =

𝐼𝑡 +𝑀𝑡 +𝐹𝑡
∑𝑛
𝑡=1
𝑡
(1+𝑟)
𝐸
𝑛
∑𝑡=1 𝑡 𝑡
(1+𝑟)

Where the sum of the costs is the investment (𝐼𝑡 ) expenditures over the expected
lifetime (n) of system, the operation and maintenance (𝑀𝑡 ) expenditures and the
fuel (𝐹𝑡 ) expenditures in the year t, in present values using discount rate (r). The
electricity (𝐸𝑡 ) generated over the lifetime of the generation is also discounted. The
levelized cost of electricity is a convenient measure to compare different generating
technologies. The lower the levelized cost the more competitive the generating
technology is. Electricity generation using renewable resources, such as solar or wind,
has no fuel costs and small variable (𝑀𝑡 ) operation and maintenance expenditure. The
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availability of financial incentives, including state or federal tax credits, can also
impact the calculation of LCOE. The estimation of the LCOE is a projection, and there
is uncertainty associated with the calculation. To estimate LCOE, we evaluate in
present values a large number of future inputs and outputs based on a number of
assumptions. This is the source of uncertainty. Also, the costs can vary regionally, and
across time, as technologies evolve and fuel prices change. The limitations of the
LCOE method are well known and documented in the literature. A recent report from
the U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2017) highlights that projected
utilization rates, the existing resource mix, and capacity values are not taken under
account in LCOE and a direct comparison of LCOE across technologies can be
problematic. EIA proposes an additional assessment to determine the cost of
electricity, the Levelized Avoided Cost of Electricity (LACE). EIA further suggests the
evaluation of both measures to assess the economic competitiveness of various
generation alternatives. However, LACE methodology is very complex and recent in
literature. The added complexity, due to the absence of historical data, is the reason
that LACE measures are not assessed in this section. Furthermore, it is not an
objective of this research to compare the two methodologies that assess the cost of
energy generated.
LCOE is a comprehensive tool and commonly cited measurement used to evaluate and
compare different technologies that generate electricity. The numbers reported for the
LCOE used in this research have value as a trend. The levelized cost of electricity may
vary significantly across regions, and as already mentioned, is an estimated projection.
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3.3.1 The LCOE of renewable energy resources
A presentation of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), for renewable energy
resources, is used to develop an understanding about the cost gap between clean
generation supply and energy conservation. The supply cost of electricity from
renewable resources continues to decline in US, as wind remains the most costeffective renewable technology. The utility-scale of solar photovoltaic (PV)
technology demonstrates a higher rate of cost decrease.
The wind LCOE decreased 66% in the period 2009-2016. The same period, utilityscale solar LCOE decreased 85% (Lazard, 2016).

Figure 8: Unsubsidized LCOE of wind and solar energy (2009-2016)

Figure 8: Unsubsidized LCOE of wind and solar energy (2009-2016), demonstrates a
clear picture of cost reduction for renewable resources. Even though renewable energy
is increasingly cost-competitive, the cost has declined relatively modestly over the last
five years for wind and rooftop solar. The LCOE decreases further with the inclusion
of federal and state incentives. Table 4: LCOE - Renewable Resource (Lazard-2016)
provides the range of the LCOE from renewable resources, based on the data provided
from the investment bank, Lazard, in a study published in December 2016.
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Plant Type

Min
per
MWh

Max
per
MWh

Wind onshore

$32

$62

Solar PV – Residential Rooftop

$138

$222

Solar PV – C&I Rooftop

$88

$193

Solar Utility Scale (thin film)

$46

$56

Solar Utility Scale (crystalline)

$49

$61

Table 4: LCOE - Renewable Resource (Lazard-2016)
The prices provided are based on an 8% cost-of-capital and a facility life-circle that
ranges from 20 to 30 years.
In 2015, annual energy outlook, published by the EIA, provided LCOE for those
plants going into service in the year 2020 (EIA, Annual Energy Outlook , 2016).
Those projected prices are much higher than the LCOE provided by Lazard (2016).
Plant Type

Min per
MWh

Average
per MWh

Max per
MWh

Wind

$65.6

$73.6

$81.6

Solar PV

$97.8

$125.3

$193.3

Table 5: LCOE - Renewable Resources (EIA-2015)
Data provided by the Advanced Energy Economy Institute (AEEI), dispute the EIA
reported LCOE. The AEEI data conclude that the average power purchase
agreement (PPA) for wind power was already at $24/MWh in 2013, and for the utilityscale solar PV, the price ranges from $50 to $75/MWh.
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3.3.2 The LCOE of energy efficiency
The most comprehensive estimates, for the total cost of saving electricity, were
published in a report by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Hoffman, 2015).
The report evaluates the electricity savings gained through energy efficiency programs
that have been funded by ratepayers in 20 states. The report estimates that the U.S.
average total cost of saved electricity, weighted by energy savings, was $0.046 per
kWh for the period 2009 to 2013. The median value for programs, with claimed
energy savings across all sectors, was $0.069 per kWh. The difference between the
average and median reflects the fact that some programs delivered a large share of
overall savings at a low total cost.
In the report by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the total cost of saved
energy is the total cost of the energy saved, spread in equal payments, over the
economic life of the actions taken through a utility program, divided by the annual
energy saved.
LCOEE =

𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟∗(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (𝑘𝑊ℎ)

Where LCOEE is the levelized cost of energy efficiency. The capital recovery factor is
𝐴∗(1+𝐴)𝐵
(1+𝐴)𝐵 −1

, where A is the discount rate, and B the estimated program lifetime in years.

The study used a 6 percent real discount rate as an approximation of the weighted
average cost of capital for an investor-owned electric utility. The evaluation used
claimed savings since program administrators do not report evaluated or verified
savings.
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Chapter 4. Research Findings
4.1. First Empirical Application - National level analysis
From 2005 to 2015, utilities reported that EE programs saved 1.05% of the sample’s
annual electricity consumption, on average. During the same period, the EE programs
had an average cost of $0.0396 per kWh, saved in nominal dollars, and an adjusted
cost of $0.042 in 2015 dollars. In order to test the hypothesis of whether EE
expenditures increased the energy efficiency of the US economy, we estimate the
percent change in aggregate US electricity consumption due to aggregate expenditure
on energy efficiency EE. Based on the econometric modeling assessed from this
research, the savings produced by utilities are estimated to be between 0.48% - 0.75%
of the sample’s annual electricity consumption. The results imply a price elasticity of
energy efficiency ranging between 0.29 - 0.54; indicating a rebound effect. This
rebound effect implies that energy use is reduced less than proportionately to the
increase in energy efficiency. It translates to an average cost of $0.051 - $0.06 per
kWh saved, in nominal dollars, and an adjusted cost of $0.055 - $0.064 in 2015
dollars. The key finding is that utilities have been overestimating electricity savings
and underestimating costs associated with EE incentive programs. The existence of a
rebound effect suggests that energy savings are less than proportional to the increase
in energy efficiency. However, consumers also benefit from an increase in energy
services, since they get more of the service, at less cost to them. This claim is based
on point estimates of average EE electricity savings and costs implied by an
econometric model of electricity demand.
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Electric utility companies have been implementing EE programs across the US for
decades. During the past five years, we observe a strong positive trend in
strengthening these programs by increasing their investments. EE programs’
expenditure reached a high of $5.7 billion in 2015. The market of EE investments is
estimated to be between $41 (IEA, 2017) and $63.7 (AEE, 2016) billion in revenue.
Lighting is the largest segment and accounts for 39% of the total U.S. building
efficiency revenue. The investments in HVAC equipment and in building envelop
follow with 22% of the total revenues (AEE, 2016). A study in 2015, prepared by
Booz Allen Hamilton for the U.S. Green Building Council, identifies that the green
building sector supports over 2.3 million jobs and will directly contribute an additional
1.1 million jobs by 2018 (Hamilton, 2015).
The industry is growing rapidly. Furthermore, there is an almost universal belief that
EE will not only reduce electricity consumption but will also decrease the
environmental impacts of fossil fuels. As a result, policymakers approach the energy
efficiency market as a ‘win-win’; a success story that improves consumers’ wellbeing
while boosting the economy with large investments and the creation of new jobs.
The literature review section of this paper identified empirical evidence that EE
programs promote cost-effective investments. The studies examined suggest that there
is a strong statistically significant effect of EE programs on reducing electricity
consumption. However, there is also an increasing concern that savings estimated by
utilities are exceeding the actual performance of the programs. Moreover, the literature
also highlights the rebound effect that can occur after the implementation of EE
investments; when consumers realize decreasing electricity expenses, they tend to
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increase their consumption. In addition, selection bias reduces the effectiveness of the
programs, as EE incentives do not always target end-consumers on the margin of
doing EE. Instead, EE programs provide incentives to all consumers, many of whom
would implement the investment even without the additional benefits of the programs
(‘free riders’). However, this transfer of funding to consumers that would have
adopted the practices anyway has an ethical argument in favor. A transfer is not
unwelcome since the program rewards those who adopt desirable actions, even if they
didn’t require the reward to adopt the action. In the pollution “offset” literature, this is
referred to as “additionality”— actions that would be taken “in addition to” those that
would happen without the program.
The argument is that the rebound effect and free-riders lead to the overestimation of
the overall energy savings that result from program implementation. At the same time,
it may be in the best interest of utilities to demonstrate higher-than-actual electricity
savings, since EE programs are designed to compensate utilities based on the savings
achieved by the programs. These factors can develop a gap between expected and
realized savings from Energy Efficiency programs.
This chapter provides results that are consistent with the reviewed literature. The
econometric model used in this paper suggests that EE expenditure does reduce
electricity consumption. EE programs provide robust incentives to consumers and to
businesses to overcome market barriers to the implementation of EE investments.
Contemporary technological improvements and industrial automated production
processes tend to reduce costs of new, improved and innovative efficient products. In
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this economic landscape, EE incentives seem to accelerate and promote investments in
energy efficiency.
However, this analysis raises a concern about the magnitude of the effects of EE
programs. This research indicates that observed savings are less than those reported by
utilities, which implies a cost of energy saved through EE is higher than that
estimated by utilities, which has implications for cost-effectiveness of EE programs.
This makes the creation of successful policy more complicated. Especially since
policymakers and energy stakeholders generally believe that the industry needs
additional incentives, particularly under the environmental threat of GHG emissions
under the assumption that EE is the most cost-effective energy resource available
(Yang & Yu, 2015).
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4.1.1 Findings on reported electricity savings
In the examined period, 2005 to 2015, utilities reported that EE programs saved 1.05%
of the sample’s annual electricity consumption, on average. During the same period,
EE programs had an average cost of $0.0396 per kWh saved in nominal dollars and an
adjusted cost of $0.042 in 2015 dollars.
The number of electric utilities that participated in EE Programs for the same period is
a subset of the total number of utilities. In 2005, 251 utilities that participated in EE
programs reported incremental energy savings, from program implementation, that
had an average annual cost of $5.01 million. Eleven years later in 2015, the number of
electric utilities with active EE programs had doubled. It is worth mentioning that not
only is there a significant increase in the number of electric utilities offering EE
programs, but programs became more extensive. The average program cost increased
from $5.1 to $9.76 million, a 95% increase. As a consequence, the total expenditure
for EE programs for the year 2015 increased to $5.73 billion. This figure, when
compared to the $1.26 billion that was spent in 2005, represents an increase of 355%,
in nominal values. The total cost of program implementation can be divided into two
categories: the financial incentives that are provided to end customers, and all other
costs. Customer’s financial incentives can be in the form of cash payments, subsidized
tariff rates relative to non-participants, in-kind services like design work, and any
benefits directly provided to end customers for their participation in a program. Before
2010, the “other costs” category was reported in terms of direct and indirect costs to
the utility. Annually reported program expenditures by group of expense and by state
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are presented in Table 7: Annual Costs of Electricity Efficiency Program
Implementation.
For the examined period, annual nation-wide electricity sales follow a flat trend.
Utility annual sales, revenues, number of customers and number of utilities that were
in business, are presented in Table 9: Annual Electricity Consumption in US.
Electricity sales to residential, commercial and industrial customers are depicted in
Table 10: Electricity consumption by Sector in US (MWh). Based on the data
presented, there is a notable reduction in the industrial sector’s demand for electricity,
from 27.79% in 2005 to 26.24% in 2015. During the same period, the residential
sector’s share was stable and flat while the commercial sector’s share increased from
34.89% in 2005 to 36.20% in 2015. The number of utilities that provided services in
the examined period fell from 3,541 utilities in 2005 to 3,212 in 2015, a 9.3%
decrease.
The reported, incremental, annual, average electricity savings increased from 23,421
MWh in 2005, to 44,615 MWh in 2015. In addition, for the last three years of the
period examined, 2013 to 2015, utilities started to report lifecycle electricity savings
from implemented programs. The ratio of incremental to lifecycle savings provides
information about the weighted average in years of savings achieved by a program’s
portfolio. For the period 2013 to 2015, this ratio was 10.9 years. This means that, on
average, the impact of program implementation will result in energy savings for a
period of about 11 years from the date of intervention.
The weighted average electricity savings (S) as a percent of electricity consumption
for EE programs implemented for the examined period are:
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𝑇

(S)=

𝑛
∑𝑁
𝑛=1 ∑𝑡=1(𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 )
𝑇

𝑛
∑𝑁
𝑛=1 ∑𝑡=1 𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡

Which equals 1.05% of the associated electricity consumption. Program costs can be
expressed as:
(C) =

𝑇𝑛
∑𝑁
𝑛=1 ∑𝑡=1 𝐶𝑛𝑡
𝑇
𝑛
∑𝑁
𝑛=1 ∑𝑡=1(𝑀𝑊ℎ(0)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 )

which is the weighted average cost per kWh saved (reported by utilities); $0.0396 in
nominal dollars and a adjusted cost of $0.042 in 2015 dollars.
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4.1.2 Findings on econometric modeling to derive electricity savings
In order to test the hypothesis of whether EE expenditures increased the energy
efficiency of the US economy, we estimate the percent change in aggregate US
electricity consumption due to aggregate expenditure on EE. From 2005 to 2015,
based on the econometric modeling presented in the methodology chapter, the savings
produced by utilities are estimated to be between 0.48% - 0.75% of the sample’s
annual electricity consumption. The results imply a price elasticity of energy
efficiency in the range of 0.29 - 0.54. This is an indication of a rebound effect. Based
on this estimation, the EE programs had an average cost of $0.051 - $0.06 per kWh
saved, in nominal dollars, and an adjusted cost of $0.0551 - $0.0648 in 2015 dollars.
The performed analysis is based on models described in the methodology section. The
essence of the concept is that while we can observe electricity consumption after the
implementation of an EE program, we cannot observe what the demand for electricity
would have been in the absence of the program. For this reason, we used econometric
modeling to construct an estimate of electricity demand, as it would have been without
the EE programs. For this purpose, four specifications are presented in Table 19: Effect
of EE programs in Electricity Consumption, to better describe the relationship between
electricity consumption - 𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑛𝑡 - and expenditures for EE programs. The dependent
variable is the logarithmically transformed electricity consumption, the difference of
which 𝛥𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑛𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡 - 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑊ℎ(1)𝑛𝑡−1
represents a percent change in consumption.
The regression specification is identified by equation (5) as:
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𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 =𝛽1 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽2 + 𝛸𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽3 + 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝛽3 +𝜇𝑖 +𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(5)

Where the dependent variable (𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 ) is the logarithmic sales of electricity for utility
(i), in state (j), in year (t). 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the logarithmic EE program cost. The estimate of the
coefficient 𝛽1 is an elasticity of energy consumption with respect to expenditures on the
energy efficiency program. The interpretation of 𝛽1 is the effect of energy efficiency
programs on electricity consumption and is the primary objective of this application.
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 controls for the number of customers for utility i, in state j, in the year t. 𝛸𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a
vector of utility level covariates and 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of state level covariates. The
𝜇𝑖 , 𝜈𝑡 , 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 :are utility and year fixed effects and the potentially heteroskedastic error
term.
Taking first differences of equation (5) we estimate:
𝛥𝑡 𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽1 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 𝑌𝑖𝑗 𝛽2+ 𝛥𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑗 𝛽3+ 𝛥𝑡 𝑍𝑗 𝛽4 + 𝛥𝑡 ν + 𝛥𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (6)
Where 𝛥𝑡 is the first difference of electricity consumption in period t and (t-1):
𝛥𝑡 𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗 =𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
The specification (5) includes year fixed effects to control for changes that are common
to all utilities. The coefficient 𝛽1 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 in equation (5), is a measure of the effect of
EE program cost, at the utility level, on electricity consumption. The model
specification controls for covariates that vary over time within states and utilities. At the
utility level, time-varying variables include the number of customers that each utility
services, and the sales share of Commercial and Industrial sectors. State time-varying
covariates include the cost of electricity, weather conditions in terms of cooling and
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heating degree days, gross state product, and the cost of natural gas and housing
characteristics.

The results of the econometric model are presented in Table 19: Effect of EE programs
in Electricity Consumption. These results show that for the period 2005-2011 the EE
expenditure is statistically significant, at better than 1% (p<0.01), with the expected
negative sign. As utilities increase EE program costs, electricity consumption decreases.
The coefficient for the number of customers and the degree days is positive and
statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient for cooling degree days is
higher than the one for heating degree days. This indicates a stronger relationship
between electricity consumption and cooling needs. Electricity price has a negative sign
in models 3 and 4 but is statistically significant at p<0.1 only in model 3. Model 4
includes year fixed effects.
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4.2 Second Empirical Application - State level analysis findings
This section addresses the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs in reducing
energy consumption, using data at the state level. In the examined period, 2005 to
2015, the second empirical application assessed the most aggressive, in terms of
expenditure, EE program in US, the electricity EE program of Rhode Island. Two
distinct methodologies, the DiD, and SCM compare Rhode Island’s residential
electricity consumption per customer with a counterfactual estimate. Here,
counterfactual means “what would have occurred without an aggressive EE program
in place.”
This section applies the difference in differences and synthetic control method to
assess the effectiveness of energy efficiency programs in reducing energy use at the
state level using observational data from states in New England. This methodology
evaluates program performance between states with dynamic EE investment policies
and states with moderate investments in EE programs.
Findings from the comparative case study using the SCM, suggest that electricity sales
in Rhode Island fell after the implementation of an aggressive EE program in 2008.
However, the estimate of reduction is less than expected and reported by utilities. This
difference is consistent with the findings of the first empirical application. The second
methodology, using DiD, compared the performance of the residential electricity EE
program of RI with that of NH and ME. The study identified that there is not a
statistically significant effect on residential consumption, as a result of the substantial
increase in EE expenditure in RI during the period 2008 to 2015, relative to NH and
ME, states with more moderate programs.
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The main objectives of states’ energy policies are to provide a reliable, clean and lowcost energy supply. Energy efficiency (EE) programs, funded by ratepayers, influence
this objective by supporting the concept that the cheapest energy is the energy you
don’t produce in the first place. This section examines the question of whether highintensity EE programs, as expressed with the adoption of aggressive spending,
contribute to proportionately larger energy savings. The scenario being examined
describes the situation where the cost of electric EE programs increases significantly by a factor of 2 or higher, as an outcome of changes in policy. In this case,
stakeholders expect the observed electricity consumption to follow a different trend, to
decrease, in comparison to the pre-intervention period. However, the outcome of the
intervention may not result in a clear change in consumption. In this case, program
administrators may assume that there is another effect in play; an increase in
consumption was avoided. Under the second scenario, the absence of an observed
counterfactual creates uncertainty in the identification of a program’s effectiveness.
The goal of this chapter is to identify if a continuous increase in EE incentives will
bring the desired and expected policy outcomes.
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4.2.1 Difference in differences methodology
In the examined period, 2005 - 2015, the second empirical application assessed the
energy efficiency policy of Rhode Island and compared its outcome to Maine and New
Hampshire. Findings suggest that there is not a statistically significant effect in
residential consumption as a result of the substantial increase in EE expenditure in RI
during the period 2008 to 2015.
Specifically, the DiD methodology was employed to identify if a legislative act known
as Least Cost Procurement (LCP) that established new standards in energy efficiency
investment decisions affected the residential electricity consumption in Rhode Island.
Rhode Island’s least-cost procurement policy requires that energy demands be met in a
manner that is cost-effective, reliable, prudent and environmentally responsible. The
same policy also permitted an increase in EE program expenditures from about 2% of
total annual electricity revenues, to about 7% by the year 2013, making RI the state
with the most aggressive EE program in the US.

Figure 9: Cost of Electricity Efficiency Programs
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Treatment is defined by the magnitude of the cost of the EE program spending as a
percentage of total electricity sales revenues. Initially, utilities were grouped into
discrete groups (D) based on their spending on EE programs. The lowest percent of
expenditure for EE programs was chosen to serve as the control group. Then, instead
of using the two-period model, effects are estimated in three periods. 1) preimplementation (PI), in which utilities have approximately the same level of EE
program spending, 2) post-implementation first phase (PI1P), which is after the
announcement of a substantial increase in the expenditure on EE programs. This is the
phase with higher expected savings, and 3) post-implementation second (PI2P); this is
the phase of implementation with lower expected savings.
The model described allows for two treatment periods, PI1P and PI2P, to have a
differential impact on electricity intensity. PI1P, the intermediate period, may include
low hanging fruit savings and behavioral impacts, while savings for the P12P period
may include more comprehensive, deep savings that are less cost-effective. The
specification is:
𝐺

ln(𝑐𝑖 ) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖
𝑘=2

+ ∑𝐺𝑘=2 𝛾1𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘𝑖 𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 + ∑𝐺𝑘=2 𝛾2𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘𝑖 𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 ′δ + 𝜀𝑖

(1)

￼ is the electricity consumption in utility i𝑐𝑖 ￼𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑘𝑖 , equal to one, if an EE
program in utility i is within the ￼𝑘 𝑡ℎ ￼ 𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 ￼𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖 , equal to one, if consumption
occurs in period ￼𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 ￼𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖 ￼𝑋𝑖 number of residential customers, price of
electricity, state specific GDP, heat and cooling degree days, housing characteristics
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and share of electricity in heating methods. ￼𝑋𝑖 control group in time period PI.
Finally, ￼𝜀𝑖
ents are interpreted as follows:￼ 𝛼𝑘 ￼𝛽1 ￼𝛽2￼𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 ￼𝑃𝐼2𝑃𝑖 ￼𝛾1𝑘 ￼𝛾2𝑘 , and
measure, for ￼𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 ￼ respectively, the differential change in residential electricity
consumption from the pre-announcement time period for group k relative to the
change in consumption of the control group.
Table 20: Difference in differences estimate of the EE program spending, presents the
causal inference estimates for the effect of EE programs on RI residential electricity
consumption. There are four different columns that represent four different models. All
four models utilize panel data over a period of 11 years, in three states (RI, ME and
NH). The dependent variable is the logarithmic transformation of residential electricity
consumption, reported from each utility ln(𝑐𝑖 ).
The set of coefficients is described in Table 20: Difference in differences estimate of
the EE program spending, under the section Difference-in-Differences corresponding
to 𝛾1𝑘 and 𝛾2𝑘 in equation (1) represents the coefficients of interest. They measure the
differential change in residential electricity consumption in two periods, T1 for period
𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 and T2 for 𝑃𝐼1𝑃𝑖 , for RI utilities relative to the change in consumption of
utilities in ME and NH in the period before the year 2008. The coefficients under the
DT1 description correspond to 𝛾1𝑘 coefficients of equation (1) and describe the
interaction terms between the treatment group (RI utilities) and the first treatment
period, years 2008-2010. All coefficients have a negative sign but are statistically
insignificant. The same negative sign and statistical insignificance are seen on the
coefficients corresponding to 𝛾2𝑘 for period T2, years 2011 to 2014.
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Figure 10: Residential Electricity Consumption Index (ME, NH, RI), provides an
insight into the residential electricity consumption for a period larger than the already
examined. The objective of the index is to provide, in a comparative framework, the
trend of electricity consumption. Having as the base year, 2005, we observe how
electricity consumption changes, annually, through year 2016. The treated unit, the
state of RI, and the control states followed similar trends, over the examined period.

Figure 10: Residential Electricity Consumption Index (ME, NH, RI)
The Figure 11: Residential Electricity Consumption kWh (ME, NH, RI) – represents
the trend of the annual residential electricity consumption per consumer for the period
of the study in kWh.
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Figure 11: Residential Electricity Consumption kWh (ME, NH, RI)

Table 6: Pre and Post Treatment Differences of RI, NH, ME (2005-2015)
Rhode
New
Diff. RIDiff. RIYear
Maine
Island
Hampshire
NH
ME
2005

7.439

7.744

6.658

-0.305

0.781

2006

7.036

7.486

6.348

-0.450

0.688

2007

7.292

7.586

6.357

-0.295

0.935

2008

7.074

7.395

6.258

-0.321

0.816

2009

6.796

7.479

6.257

-0.683

0.539

2010

7.240

7.508

6.249

-0.268

0.991

2011

7.237

7.429

6.247

-0.192

0.989

2012

7.168

7.378

6.367

-0.210

0.801

2013

7.222

7.544

6.615

-0.322

0.607

2014

6.996

7.432

6.593

-0.436

0.403

2015

7.123

7.452

6.668

-0.329

0.455
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4.2.2 Synthetic control method (SCM)
We apply the synthetic control method to study the effects of the Least Cost
Procurement (LCP) legislation in RI. LCP required Rhode Island’s utilities to invest in
cost-effective energy efficiency that is less expensive than supply. Large-scale
investments in EE programs started, in RI, in 2008. Using the techniques described in
Chapter 3, we construct a synthetic Rhode Island, with weights (W) chosen such that
the constructed synthetic Rhode Island best represents the values of the predictors of
electricity consumption for residential customers in Rhode Island in the preimplementation period. Subsequently, cross-validation technique was introduced to
𝑘

choose the weights 𝑢𝑚 in Equation: ∑𝑚=1 𝑢𝑚 (𝑋1𝑚 − 𝑋0𝑚 𝑊)2
where 𝑢𝑚 is a weight that reflects the relative importance assigned to the m-th variable
(X), when we measure the discrepancy between 𝑋1𝑚 − 𝑋0𝑚 𝑊.
Synthetic controls must closely reproduce the values that variables with large
predictive power, on the outcome of interest, take for the unit affected by the
intervention. Accordingly, those variables should be assigned large 𝑢𝑚 weights. In the
empirical application below, we apply a cross-validation method to choose 𝑢𝑚 .
We use predictors measured in the pre-implementation to select the weights 𝑢𝑚 , such
that the constructed synthetic control minimizes the root mean square prediction error
(RMSPE).

Initially, SCM is applied to a single treated unit, the state of RI. Each synthetic version
is constructed with weights from a pool of control states. Predictors include
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demographic variables, income and lagged dependent outcomes. Figure 12 displays
annual per-residential-customer electricity consumption for Rhode Island, and its
synthetic counterpart, from 2005-2015. Table 26 displays the weight of each control
state in the synthetic Rhode Island. The weights reported in table 27, indicate that
electricity consumption trends in RI, prior to the passage of LCP, are best reproduced
by a combination of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. The
remaining states, in the donor pool, were assigned zero weights (W). The weights
assigned to state donors, combined with the high balance on electricity consumption
predictors (Table 28), created a synthetic Rhode Island that provides an estimate to the
per customer electricity consumption that would have occurred, in the absence of the
LCP legislation. The developed SCM provides a methodical approach to estimate this
counterfactual; the state of RI after the year 2008.
In 2008, residential electricity consumption decreased markedly, in RI, relative to a
comparable synthetic control region. We estimate that, by the year 2015, annual perconsumer residential electricity consumption in Rhode Island was 97 kWh lower, on
average, than what it would have been in the absence of LCP.
RI

synthetic RI

kwh per consumer

7.4
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2006

2007

2008
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2010
year
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7.2

7

2014

6.8
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Figure 12: Residential electricity consumption in RI vs. synthetic RI
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This reduction accounts for 1.34% of the average annual per consumer residential
consumption of the post-treatment period. Another important finding is that electricity
savings are not increasing cumulatively. The observed annual consumption is lower
than the counterfactual, but its magnitude doesn’t increase over time. This is an
indication of an existing rebound effect. As the service of electricity decreases,
consumers adjust their consumption to a higher level.
4.2.2.1 Inference about the effect of the LCP in RI To evaluate the statistical
significance of our estimates, we pose the question of whether the results could be
driven entirely by chance. How often would we obtain results of this magnitude if we
had randomly chosen a state, for the study, instead of Rhode Island? To answer this
question, we use placebo tests. We evaluate findings and results from a treated unit. A
placebo study evaluates northeast states with moderate expenditures in EE programs.
If the treatment effect was not random, the effect should be more visible in the treated
state.
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Figure 13: Residential electricity consumption – Placebo study
Figure 13: Residential electricity consumption – Placebo study demonstrates the
synthetic control method to study the effects of EE programs in the Northeast US with
moderate incentive programs in EE, during the same period. Moderate EE programs
are defined, in this study, based on the reported savings as a percentage of the total
residential consumption. Five states NH, CT, NJ, NY and PA reported less than half
the percentage of electricity savings compared to RI’s EE program.
Findings show that Connecticut and New Jersey have real-synthetic gaps; with their
real consumption being lower than their synthetic. In contrast, Pennsylvania has the
opposite effect of real-synthetic gaps. In New York and New Hampshire, the gaps are
small and fluctuate in the post-intervention period.
In conclusion, the state of RI’s post-intervention electricity consumption trajectory has
similarities with the five states it was compared with. The treatment effect, the gap
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between real vs. synthetic, is more visible in the treated state (RI) compared to NY,
NH, and PA. However, CT and NJ both provide large intervention effects, even
without aggressive EE programs.
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4.3 Cost Comparison - Energy efficiency and renewable energy generation
Over the examined period, renewable energy generation declined significantly in the
US. Wind remains the most cost-effective renewable technology, and the LCOE of
wind supply is close to $0.05 per kWh. The utility-scale of solar photovoltaic
technology demonstrates a higher rate of cost decrease with an average LCOE of
$0.06 per kWh. These estimates for the LCOE of renewable resources are before any
incentives.
Using EE investments to decrease the demand of electricity, the claimed energy
savings had a cost of $0.069 per kWh (Hoffman, 2015). This estimate is rather
conservative based on the analysis of this research. However, the comparison of the
levelized cost of energy vs. energy efficiency does not consider the environmental
costs of energy supply. Comparing this cost to the average cost of electricity, in the
same period, $0.1043 per kWh - Table 12- suggests that the cost of implementing EE
is considerably lower than the cost of electricity supply. This finding supports the
continued increase of EE program development. However, this research finds that the
levelized cost of EE is higher than believed. Although the increased cost is still rather
low, compared to the average cost of consumed electricity, there is a question about
the cost-effectiveness of EE in comparison to renewable energy generation. The
levelized cost of renewable energy has dropped drastically over the past few years and
continues to decrease. As this trend continues, renewable energy programs may
challenge the cost-effectiveness of EE investments. Future empirical research is
needed to address an important question: “what is the tipping point where the energy
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markets must prioritize incentives for renewable energy programs over energy
efficiency?”
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Chapter 5. Conclusion, Discussion

Energy efficiency programs provide well-documented benefits to end-users. Having a
long history of implementation, the residential, commercial and industrial sectors
utilize EE programs to replace inefficient legacy equipment, save energy and decrease
operational costs. Since their introduction in the 1970’s, and throughout their history,
EE programs have not always had the same objectives. Following the 1973 energy
crisis, energy independence became the top priority of national energy policies and EE
programs were implemented to serve this objective. Since then, many parameters have
changed in the energy sector. The market economy dominates global trade, fossil fuel
reserves are higher than previously believed, (Table 25: Proved Reserves of Fossil
Fuels) and new technologies, especially from renewable resources, generate costeffective clean energy. At the same time, environmental concerns of the impact fossil
fuel emissions have on climate change are at the center of every discussion regarding
the future of energy generation. Although, as described, the economic environment has
changed significantly, energy efficiency continues to play an important role in many
states’ energy policies.
In recent years, energy efficiency programs have protected end-users from the increase
of energy costs. Utilities have developed customer-funded programs that provide
financial incentives to ratepayers willing to invest in efficient equipment. These
programs have become very popular. So much so, that spending for electricityreducing measures increased every year for the 11-year period examined in this study.
The support for these programs is almost universal amongst stakeholders. Utilities,
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state governments, and consumers alike, view efficiency programs positively. Utilities
benefit twofold as EE programs benefit both their budgets and their profits. As shown
in the analysis, administrative and other costs (not incentives to customers) represent,
on average, 45% of the total expenses for the examined period. Additionally, utilities
get financial benefits when they achieve their energy-saving targets. State
governments benefit too, as EE programs provide funding for state energy programs.
Moreover, EE incentives are in-line with consumer’s increasingly environmentally
conscious behavior. Consumers, especially residential, are supportive because EE’s
popular rebates make the purchase of high-end, efficient equipment more affordable.
Concerns that EE programs tend to benefit wealthier consumers, and increase the cost
of electricity supply, are not prevalent.
It is not in the scope of this study to question the benefits from energy efficiency
improvements or examine who benefits most from EE programs. This study examines
the effectiveness of these programs and their magnitude, as reported by utilities. The
first empirical application, at the national level, provides evidence that the costeffectiveness of these programs is lower than utilities claim. The results imply a price
elasticity of energy efficiency ranging between 0.29 and 0.54. These numbers indicate
a rebound effect. Consequently, energy savings are less than proportional to the
increase in energy efficiency. However, consumers also benefit from an increase in
energy services, since they get more of the service, at less cost to them.
This research makes the claim that energy consumption can be better explained by
using the principles of economic behavior, as opposed to the reasoning-by-analogy
approach. Economic agents, consumers, and businesses adjust their demand for energy
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by increasing their consumption as the cost of energy drops. Doing so, increases their
utility. This behavior is not taken into account by the engineering reports utilities
produce. Utilities evaluate energy savings using the reasoning-by-analogy approach;
estimating an equipment’s efficiency and then scaling up the benefits to society.
However, this analogical reasoning is based on the assumption that the price elasticity
of demand is very small (or even zero) for all consumers, which is a very strong
assumption. As the cost for the service provided from energy usage decreases, the
consumption of the service will increase by the commodity’s elasticity. As a result, the
rebound effect will partially offset increases in energy efficiency. So, reductions in
demand decrease are less than in proportion to increase in energy efficiency.
However, it is important to recognize that there are significant welfare implications
from such behavior. Consumers benefit from receiving more of the service. Further
research is needed to quantify the exact welfare implications, but it can be assumed
that utility increases when one can use more electricity. A good example of this, are
the EE investments in highway lighting that have decreased energy and maintenance
costs. Due to the reduction in costs of lighting highways, the RIDOT chose to
significantly increase the hours highway lights are on. In this case, use of electricity
was reduced less than in proportion to the increase in energy efficiency. Ultimately,
less electricity was used, and citizens also benefit from safer highway conditions, due
to increased highway lighting.
The state-level empirical application provided an insight into expectations from
aggressive EE programs. For a number of years, Rhode Island has been the state with
the highest per capita expenditure for EE programs, in the nation. Following a
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comparative analysis, there are indications that Rhode Island does indeed realize
savings but those savings are lower than expected.
In the examined period, 2005 - 2015, the state-level empirical application assessed the
energy efficiency policy of Rhode Island and compared its outcome to Maine and New
Hampshire. Findings of the difference in differences analysis provide evidence that the
higher savings observed in RI, compared to the control states of NH and ME, are not
statistically significant. However, a re-evaluation of the Rhode Island EE policy, using
the synthetic control method identifies that by the year 2015, annual per-consumer
residential electricity consumption in Rhode Island was 97 kWh (1.34%) lower, on
average, than it would have been in the absence of this policy.
There are numerous reasons for this. The cost per energy unit saved is a result of many
parameters; from how a state’s program is developed to how effectively a program is
implemented. States with a long history in EE, like New York and California, have
decreased their rate of spending on such programs, in recent years. Both these states
have increased their efforts in other areas such as adoption of higher standards for
appliances and equipment, adopting building codes that make homes more efficient,
and emphasizing improvements in transportation. Moving forward it is
important for states to reevaluate the priorities of their EE programs. Financial
incentives have limitations and the cost of EE, per energy unit saved (kWh), is already
at the same level as the levelized cost of renewable energy generation. Of course, it is
important to keep in mind that renewable energy has negative externalities as well.
Renewable energy impacts wildlife (especially birds), and has noise and visual
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impacts, that are not embodied in the LCOE. In comparison, EE has mostly positive
externalities. This is an important environmental advantage of the EE energy policies.
As consumers increase their investments in renewable energy, they become more
sensitive to energy issues, in general. Investments in renewable energy may lead to
larger changes in demand patterns than the investments in EE programs have been
able to accomplish. Further research is needed to examine how investments in
renewable energy affect energy efficiency.
There is no doubt that incentive programs in energy efficiency have merits, both
conceptually and practically. However, there are likely to be diminishing returns to
investments in energy efficiency. Further study is needed to find the proper balance
between investments in energy production and demand management, through energy
efficiency programs.
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Figures and Tables
Table 7: Annual Costs of Electricity Efficiency Program Implementation
EE Total Cost

EE Incentives

Percentage

Other Costs

Percentage

(,000)

(,000)(*)

over total

(,000)(**)

over total

2005

$1,258,894

$634,867

50%

$624,027

50%

2006

$1,348,756

$650,607

48%

$698,148

52%

2007

$1,787,603

$845,536

47%

$942,067

53%

2008

$2,470,412

$1,079,891

44%

$1,390,521

56%

2009

$2,528,808

$1,133,910

45%

$1,394,898

55%

2010

$3,097,294

$1,614,853

52%

$1,482,441

48%

2011

$4,254,096

$2,369,344

56%

$1,884,752

44%

2012

$4,644,657

$2,454,144

53%

$2,190,513

47%

2013

$4,819,062

$2,872,906

60%

$1,946,156

40%

2014

$5,620,182

$3,411,034

61%

$2,209,148

39%

2015

$5,730,573

$3,449,385

60%

$2,281,188

40%

Total

$37,560,337

$20,516,477

55%

$17,043,859

45%

Year

(*) Energy Efficiency (EE) Customer incentives are the total financial value provided to a customer for
program participation: cash payments, or lowered tariff rates relative to non-participants, in-kind
services (e.g., design services), or other benefits directly provided to the customer for their program
participation.
(**) Other costs: Includes direct and indirect costs for the utility. Direct Costs, excluding incentive
payments: The cost for implementing energy efficiency programs (in thousand dollars) incurred by the
utility. Indirect Cost: A utility cost that may not be meaningfully identified with any particular EE
program category. Indirect costs could be attributable to one of several accounting cost categories (i.e.,
Administrative, Marketing, Monitoring & Evaluation, Utility-Earned Incentives, Other).
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Table 8: Reported electricity savings and associated costs from EE Programs (20052015)
Year

Energy savings (*)

Program Total Cost

(MWh)

$( ,000)

2005

5,878,693

1,258,894

2006

5,393,631

1,348,756

2007

7,679,812

1,787,603

2008

10,433,487

2,470,412

2009

12,906,637

2,528,808

2010

13,518,154

3,097,294

2011

21,421,322

4,254,096

2012

21,478,470

4,644,657

2013

24,681,728

4,819,062

2014

26,465,220

5,620,182

2015

26,189,500

5,730,573

Note: Incremental annual savings summarize the expected effect in demand in terms of MWh
for each utility caused by new participants in existing programs and all participants in new
programs during a given year.
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Table 9: Annual Electricity Consumption in US
Year

Sales (*)

Revenues (*)

Customers

Utilities

2005

3,684,351,232

$

301,982,208

139,922,272

3,541

2006

3,693,140,992

$

330,727,680

141,966,848

3,554

2007

3,787,363,072

$

348,160,512

143,681,184

3,565

2008

3,733,964,544

$

363,583,104

143,395,760

3,635

2009

3,596,795,136

$

353,289,248

143,529,312

3,675

2010

3,754,841,344

$

368,918,144

144,140,256

3,683

2011

3,749,846,272

$

371,049,088

144,509,152

3,745

2012

3,694,649,856

$

363,687,488

145,293,840

2,776

2013

3,724,867,840

$

375,057,728

146,288,576

2,800

2014

3,764,700,160

$

393,096,416

147,373,696

3,038

2015

3,758,992,384

$

391,341,472

148,633,024

3,212

Note: (*) Sales are reported in MWh and revenues in $(, 000). Includes residential, commercial,
industrial and transportation sector. Numbers represent all utilities in US - included utilities that didn’t
implement DSM programs.
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Table 10: Electricity consumption by Sector in US (MWh)
Year

Residential

Commercial

Industrial

Transportation

2005

1,367,509,248

1,285,521,664

1,023,814,080

7,506,321

2006

1,359,551,360

1,310,322,560

1,015,909,568

7,357,543

2007

1,400,106,112

1,346,912,000

1,032,172,352

8,172,595

2008

1,380,661,760

1,336,133,504

1,009,516,160

7,653,211

2009

1,364,758,144

1,306,852,480

917,416,448

7,767,989

2010

1,445,708,416

1,330,199,424

971,221,184

7,712,412

2011

1,422,801,152

1,328,057,472

991,315,584

7,672,084

2012

1,374,514,688

1,327,101,184

985,713,856

7,320,028

2013

1,394,812,160

1,337,078,784

985,351,872

7,625,041

2014

1,407,208,320

1,352,158,208

997,576,128

7,757,555

2015

1,404,096,512

1,360,751,488

986,507,712

7,636,632

Note: (*) Electricity consumption is reported in MWh. Numbers represent all utilities in US - included
utilities that didn’t implement DSM programs.
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Table 11: Share of Electricity Demand by Sector

Year

Residential

Commercial

Industrial

Transportation

2005

37.12%

34.89%

27.79%

0.20%

2006

36.81%

35.48%

27.51%

0.20%

2007

36.97%

35.56%

27.25%

0.22%

2008

36.98%

35.78%

27.04%

0.20%

2009

37.94%

36.33%

25.51%

0.22%

2010

38.50%

35.43%

25.87%

0.21%

2011

37.94%

35.42%

26.44%

0.20%

2012

37.20%

35.92%

26.68%

0.20%

2013

37.45%

35.90%

26.45%

0.20%

2014

37.38%

35.92%

26.50%

0.21%

2015

37.35%

36.20%

26.24%

0.20%

Note: (*) Shares of electricity demand represents all utilities (US) - included utilities that didn’t
implement DSM programs.
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Table 12: Average Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers - Total by End-Use
Sector, 2005 - 2015 (Cents per Kilowatt-hour)

Period

Residential

Commercial

Industrial

Transportation

All
Sectors

CPI

Adjusted

Average (base:2015)
2005

9.45

8.67

5.73

8.57

8.14

195.3

9.88

2006

10.40

9.46

6.16

9.54

8.90

201.6

10.46

2007

10.65

9.65

6.39

9.70

9.13

207.3

10.44

2008

11.26

10.26

6.96

10.71

9.74

215.3

10.72

2009

11.51

10.16

6.83

10.66

9.82

214.5

10.85

2010

11.54

10.19

6.77

10.56

9.83

218.1

10.68

2011

11.72

10.24

6.82

10.46

9.90

224.9

10.43

2012

11.88

10.09

6.67

10.21

9.84

229.6

10.16

2013

12.13

10.26

6.89

10.55

10.07

233

10.24

2014

12.52

10.74

7.10

10.45

10.44

236.7

10.45

2015

12.65

10.64

6.91

10.09

10.41

237

10.41

average

10.43

Note: Geographic coverage is the 50 States and the District of Columbia.
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-826, Monthly Electric Sales and
Revenue Report with State Distributions Report; Form EIA-861, Annual Electric Power
Industry Report; and Form EIA-861S, Annual Electric Power Industry Report (Short Form).
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Table 13: Cooling and Heating Degree Days (CDD-HDD) in Contiguous US

Year

CDD

HDD

Observations

2005

55,804

249,316

576

2006

54,149

232,922

576

2007

56,846

247,366

576

2008

49,304

262,532

576

2009

46,509

261,481

576

2010

59,385

255,095

576

2011

57,873

251,566

576

2012

60,116

220,438

576

2013

50,688

262,792

576

2014

48,634

266,883

576

2015

56,618

239,392

576

HDD and CDD are defined to a base temperature of 65° F which is adequate for human comfort. The
degree days are the number of degrees of Fahrenheit that mean outside air temperature deviates from
the base (65° F) temperature.
Monthly observations were obtained from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
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Table 14: Mean Annual Heating Degree Days by State (2005-2015)
State

HDD

State

HDD

1

North Dakota

9,146

25

Oregon

5,298

2

Montana

8,463

26

New Jersey

5,146

3

Minnesota

8,458

27

West Virginia

5,089

4

Wyoming

8,185

28

Missouri

4,975

5

Vermont

7,904

29

Kansas

4,831

6

Maine

7,735

30

Maryland

4,578

7

South Dakota

7,573

31

Delaware

4,493

8

Wisconsin

7,483

32

New Mexico

4,477

9

New Hampshire

7,434

33

Kentucky

4,421

10

Colorado

7,043

34

Virginia

4,268

11

Utah

7,003

35

Tennessee

3,786

12

Idaho

6,893

36

Oklahoma

3,543

13

Iowa

6,785

37

Nevada

3,469

14

Michigan

6,726

38

North Carolina

3,392

15

Nebraska

6,232

39

Arkansas

3,386

16

Massachusetts

6,133

40

Georgia

2,837

17

Illinois

6,089

41

California

2,811

18

New York

6,005

42

Alabama

2,718

19

Connecticut

5,867

43

South Carolina

2,631

20

Rhode Island

5,764

44

Mississippi

2,443

21

Ohio

5,720

45

Arizona

1,950

22

Pennsylvania

5,713

46

Texas

1,845

23

Washington

5,664

47

Louisiana

1,709

24

Indiana

5,646

48

Florida

681

Note: The degree days are the number of degrees of Fahrenheit that mean outside air temperature
deviates from the base (65° F) temperature. The higher the amount of heating degree days is, the higher
the amount of energy is needed to heat a building.

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
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Table 15: Mean Annual Cooling Degree Days by State (2005-2015)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

State
Florida
Arizona
Texas
Louisiana
Nevada
Mississippi
Oklahoma

8 Alabama

CDD
3,541
3,077
2,839
2,700
2,204
2,189
1,964

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

State
New Jersey
Iowa
West Virginia
Ohio
South Dakota
Pennsylvania
New York

CDD
873
818
791
780
717
700
618

1,954

32

Connecticut

600

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

South Carolina
Arkansas
Georgia
Kansas
North Carolina
Tennessee
Missouri
Kentucky
Delaware

1,944
1,809
1,736
1,507
1,466
1,425
1,283
1,228
1,157

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Michigan
Rhode Island
Utah
Wisconsin
Massachusetts
Idaho
Minnesota
North Dakota
Colorado

577
563
547
521
515
514
475
455
355

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Maryland
Virginia
Nebraska
New Mexico
California
Indiana
Illinois

1,143
1,125
1,025
1,020
939
910
892

42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Wyoming
New Hampshire
Oregon
Vermont
Maine
Montana
Washington

303
299
235
235
233
222
187

Note: The degree days are the number of degrees of Fahrenheit that mean outside air temperature
deviates from the base (65° F) temperature. The higher the amount of cooling degree days is, the higher
the amount of energy is needed to cool a building.

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
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Table 16: Residential Annual Electricity Consumption by State (2014)
Alaska
Alabama
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Mississippi
Montana
North Carolina
North Dakota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
United States
Utah
Virginia
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Wyoming

Per Capita Sales (MWh)
2,773
2,043,614
6,795
32,929,598
6,215
18,441,120
4,807
32,346,080
2,304
89,360,680
3,378
18,092,932
3,554
12,777,579
4,963
4,644,841
5,854
116,535,264
5,662
57,167,388
1,820
2,583,770
4,640
14,426,582
4,976
8,134,913
3,572
46,009,456
5,108
33,703,964
4,714
13,684,952
6,209
27,399,768
6,754
31,400,684
2,971
20,071,160
4,601
27,487,632
3,505
4,660,605
3,380
33,514,992
4,176
22,791,466
5,903
35,792,644
6,322
18,922,096
4,857
4,969,243
5,900
58,649,992
7,241
5,357,514
5,326
10,028,238
3,396
4,510,487
3,120
27,892,582
3,170
6,611,970
4,199
11,916,521
2,531
49,974,912
4,553
52,804,336
6,018
23,351,144
4,688
18,617,612
4,236
54,195,336
2,910
3,070,347
6,361
30,715,986
5,659
4,827,368
6,496
42,538,248
5,223
140,899,744
4,413 1,407,208,312
3,045
8,963,971
5,577
46,443,716
3,383
2,121,347
4,967
35,082,960
3,807
21,925,712
6,485
11,990,728
4,712
2,752,313

Counts
Per Customer Ratio
281,438
7,261 2.62
2,169,790
15,176 2.23
1,345,009
13,711 2.21
2,661,694
12,152 2.53
13,256,068
6,741 2.93
2,193,520
8,248 2.44
1,459,239
8,756 2.46
407,508
11,398 2.30
8,891,020
13,107 2.24
4,137,057
13,818 2.44
425,168
6,077 3.34
1,348,641
10,697 2.31
690,277
11,785 2.37
5,145,022
8,943 2.50
2,784,660
12,103 2.37
1,228,858
11,136 2.36
1,939,489
14,127 2.28
2,026,223
15,497 2.29
2,720,128
7,379 2.48
2,234,962
12,299 2.67
706,952
6,593 1.88
4,273,126
7,843 2.32
2,345,860
9,716 2.33
2,724,541
13,137 2.23
1,263,583
14,975 2.37
485,041
10,245 2.11
4,303,476
13,629 2.31
360,171
14,875 2.05
817,425
12,268 2.30
606,883
7,432 2.19
3,470,874
8,036 2.58
869,875
7,601 2.40
1,110,535
10,730 2.56
7,046,829
7,092 2.80
4,882,159
10,816 2.38
1,710,352
13,653 2.27
1,669,124
11,154 2.38
5,289,211
10,246 2.42
438,879
6,996 2.40
2,157,091
14,240 2.24
384,749
12,547 2.22
2,756,932
15,430 2.38
10,138,874
13,897 2.66
128,680,416
10,936 2.48
1,000,416
8,960 2.94
3,303,676
14,058 2.52
310,932
6,823 2.02
2,907,705
12,066 2.43
2,631,430
8,332 2.19
862,869
13,896 2.14
265,720
10,358 2.20

Note: Ratio=consumption per customer (meter) / consumption per capita
Highlighted cells indicate the 5 lowest values in each column.
Source: Author / Raw data: Energy Information Administration, State
Energy Data System
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Table 17: Annual Per Capita Electricity Consumption
1990 2000 2010 2015 Delta I Delta II
Alaska
3,004 2,954 2,931 2,773
(230)
(158)
Alabama
5,116 6,459 7,425 6,795 1,679
(630)
Arkansas
4,479 5,551 6,581 6,215 1,736
(366)
Arizona
4,174 4,814 5,064 4,807
633
(257)
California
2,222 2,331 2,337 2,304
81
(34)
Colorado
2,959 3,242 3,586 3,378
419
(208)
Connecticut
3,152 3,413 3,649 3,554
402
(95)
District of Columbia 2,446 2,839 3,509 3,139
693
(370)
Delaware
3,957 4,548 5,289 4,963 1,006
(326)
Florida
5,457 6,169 6,485 5,854
398
(631)
Georgia
4,596 5,416 6,337 5,662 1,066
(675)
Hawaii
2,088 2,278 2,191 1,820
(268)
(372)
Iowa
3,780 4,107 4,771 4,640
860
(130)
Idaho
5,559 5,393 5,180 4,976
(584)
(204)
Illinois
2,870 3,229 3,783 3,572
701
(212)
Indiana
3,978 4,703 5,401 5,108 1,130
(293)
Kansas
3,835 4,650 5,014 4,714
879
(300)
Kentucky
4,552 5,773 6,701 6,209 1,657
(492)
Louisiana
5,077 6,198 7,190 6,754 1,678
(436)
Massachusetts
2,587 2,761 3,261 2,971
384
(290)
Maryland
3,980 4,509 4,999 4,601
621
(398)
Maine
3,192 2,926 3,292 3,505
313
212
Michigan
2,719 3,086 3,511 3,380
661
(131)
Minnesota
3,385 3,776 4,230 4,176
792
(53)
Missouri
4,221 5,276 6,221 5,903 1,681
(319)
Mississippi
4,756 6,037 6,793 6,322 1,566
(471)
Montana
4,198 4,323 4,786 4,857
660
71
North Carolina
4,974 5,758 6,503 5,900
927
(602)
North Dakota
4,630 5,280 6,508 7,241 2,610
732
Nebraska
4,298 4,869 5,523 5,326 1,027
(197)
New Hampshire
3,097 2,948 3,405 3,396
299
(9)
New Jersey
2,640 2,912 3,442 3,120
480
(322)
New Mexico
2,343 2,711 3,270 3,170
827
(100)
Nevada
4,537 4,659 4,297 4,199
(338)
(98)
New York
2,141 2,264 2,626 2,531
390
(95)
Ohio
3,488 4,091 4,720 4,553 1,066
(167)
Oklahoma
5,423 5,686 6,300 6,018
595
(282)
Oregon
5,378 5,310 4,909 4,688
(689)
(220)
Pennsylvania
3,206 3,664 4,347 4,236 1,030
(111)
Rhode Island
2,362 2,537 2,961 2,910
548
(51)
South Carolina
5,215 6,280 7,086 6,361 1,146
(726)
South Dakota
4,112 4,528 5,672 5,659 1,547
(13)
Tennessee
5,876 6,420 7,109 6,496
620
(613)
Texas
4,840 5,581 5,433 5,223
383
(211)
United States
3,702 4,226 4,673 4,413
711
(261)
Utah
2,453 2,902 3,183 3,045
592
(139)
Virginia
4,525 5,283 6,035 5,577 1,052
(458)
Vermont
3,202 3,339 3,399 3,383
181
(17)
Washington
5,876 5,589 5,177 4,967
(909)
(210)
Wisconsin
3,340 3,708 3,919 3,807
467
(112)
West Virginia
4,226 5,389 6,711 6,485 2,259
(226)
Wyoming
3,789 4,257 4,827 4,712
924
(114)
Note: Highlighted cells indicate the 5 lowest values in each column.
Delta I column: Difference between years (2015)-(1990)
Delta II column: Difference between years (2015)-(2000)
Source: Author / Raw data: Energy Information Administration, State
Energy Data System
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Table 18: Total Energy Consumed per Capita, 2015 (million Btu)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

State
LA
WY
AK
ND
IA
TX
NE
SD
IN
WV
OK
AL
KY
MS
MT
KS
AR
SC
TN
NM
MN
OH
ID
WI
IL

Total Energy
912
893
840
803
479
470
450
447
430
421
417
393
390
379
379
372
354
337
329
325
323
322
317
308
307

Rank
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
44
46
46
48
49
50
51

State
ME
PA
MO
DE
VA
GA
MI
WA
CO
DC
UT
NJ
NC
OR
MD
NH
NV
MA
VT
AZ
FL
CT
HI
CA
RI
NY

Note: Rankings are based on the fuel source data
values.
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Total Energy
305
303
301
294
283
280
279
278
272
267
264
256
251
238
233
229
225
213
211
211
210
210
198
197
192
189

Table 19: Effect of EE programs in Electricity Consumption
Dependent Variable: First Difference (Δ) of Electricity Consumption
(1)
Model1

(2)
Model2

(3)
Model3

(4)
Model4

-0.00778***
(0.00263)
0.682***
(0.149)
0.000104***
(1.82e-05)
2.69e-05***
(3.04e-06)

-0.00627***
(0.00227)
0.866***
(0.127)
0.000101***
(1.55e-05)
2.15e-05***
(4.21e-06)
0.0243*
(0.0127)
-0.109**
(0.0511)
0.110
(0.0714)

6.315***
(1.536)

5.393***
(1.231)

-0.00576***
(0.00221)
0.852***
(0.119)
0.000133***
(3.23e-05)
4.25e-05***
(1.09e-05)
0.0121
(0.0101)
-0.190***
(0.0629)
-0.237*
(0.141)
3.067**
(1.357)
2.790**
(1.370)
-0.000472
(0.00114)
0.00409
(0.00516)
0.00878**
(0.00375)
5.492***
(1.231)

-0.00509**
(0.00214)
0.824***
(0.118)
0.000123***
(3.52e-05)
4.20e-05***
(1.07e-05)
0.0273
(0.0221)
0.166
(0.152)
-0.137
(0.144)
2.881**
(1.406)
2.668*
(1.421)
-0.000368
(0.00116)
0.00759
(0.00616)
0.00463
(0.00431)
1.049
(1.818)

R-squared
Number of
unique_id

0.325
734

0.410
734

0.440
734

0.447
734

Year FE
Est. cost/kWh
Adjusted

No
No
No
$0.050
$0.056
$0.058
$0.053
$0.060
$0.062
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Yes
$0.061
$0.065

VARIABLES
EE Investments
Customers
CDD
HDD
lnNGEID
lnGDPRV
lnESRCD
SHRCOM
SHRIND
ESACDdata
ESCCDdata
ESICDdata
Constant
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Table 20: Difference in differences estimate of the EE program spending
Residential electricity consumption (period 2005-2015).
Dependent variable: Residential electricity consumption (ln)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Variables
Random Effect
Population
Fixed Effect
Averaged Model
Utilities (relative to NH - ME)
RI
-0.222
-0.217
(0.216)
(0.187)
Time period (relative to Post Implementation)
T1
-0.084
-0.061
(0.109)
(0.104)
T2
-0.081
-0.051
(0.108)
(0.115)
Difference-in-differences
RI-T1
-0.028
0.020
(0.067)
(0.052)
RI-T2
0.051
0.049
(0.089)
(0.109)
Consumers (n)
1.060***
1.045***
(0.037)
(0.0281)
CDD
-0.000855*
-0.000975*
(0.000491)
(0.000525)
HDD
-0.000176
-0.000174
(0.000109)
(0.000113)
Electricity cost
-0.602
-0.886
(0.545)
(0.556)
Income
0.412
0.805
(0.724)
(0.594)
Occupancy
28.96*
33.10*
(16.33)
(17.05)
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of
Utilities
Utility FE
Year FE

3.559
(3.038)
326

3.258
(3.006)
326

71

71

(4)
Fixed Effect

-0.103
(0.188)
-0.100
(0.172)

0.328
(0.452)
-0.159
(0.521)

-0.057
(0.095)
0.042
(0.116)
1.080***
(0.0618)
-0.000783*
(0.000462)
-0.000182*
(0.000109)
-0.465
(0.776)
-0.191
(3.401)
27.61
(19.33)

-0.026
(0.137)
0.104
(0.189)
1.079***
(0.0581)
-0.00105
(0.00106)
0.000208
(0.000321)
-0.845
(1.294)
0.181
(5.122)
38.63
(34.03)

5.156
(10.79)
326
0.867
71

2.358
(18.41)
326
0.871
71

YES

YES
YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
129

Figure 14: Annual Residential Electricity Consumption (2015)
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Figure 15: Cooling Degree Days in the Northeastern United States

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Note: Abbreviations used in the graph: Connecticut (CT) - Massachusetts (MA) - Maine (ME) –New
Hampshire (NH) – New Jersey (NJ) – New York (NY)- Rhode Island (RI) – Pennsylvania (PA) Vermont (VT)
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Figure 16: Heating Degree Days in the Northeastern United States

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Note: Abbreviations used in the graph: Connecticut (CT) - Massachusetts (MA) - Maine (ME) –New
Hampshire (NH) – New Jersey (NJ) – New York (NY) - Rhode Island (RI) – Pennsylvania (PA) Vermont (VT)
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Figure 17: Degree Days – US Map (2015)

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
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Figure 18: New England Map
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Figure 19: Residential Electricity Consumption Index in US

Note: Index for the Residential Electricity Consumption was produced by normalizing annual
consumption to the consumption of base year 2005.
Source: Author by utilizing time series data reported by the EIA
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Table 21: Energy Efficiency Variables Reported by Year (EIA-861)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Utility id
Utility name
EE Incremental
EE Incremental
EE
ResIncremental
EE
Incremental
Com
EE
IndIncremental
EE
Annual Res
Tran
EE
Annual Com
Total
EE Annual Ind
EE Annual Tran
EE Annual Total
EE_lc_res
EE_lc_com
EE_lc_ind
EE_lc_tran
EE_lc_tot
DirectCostEE_Res
DirectCostEE_Com
DirectCostEE_Ind
DirectCostEE_Tran
DirectCostEE
IncentiveEE_Res
IncentiveEE_Com
IncentiveEE_Ind
IncentiveEE_Tran
IncentiveEE
DirectCost_lmres
DirectCostl_mcom
DirectCost_lmind
DirectCost_lmtran
DirectCost_lm
Incentive_lmres
Incentive_lmcom
Incentive_lmind
Incentive_lmtran
Incentive_lm
IndirectCost_Res
IndirectCost_Com
IndirectCost_Ind
IndirectCost_Tran
IndirectCost
TotalCost_Res
TotalCost_Com
TotalCost_Ind
TotalCost_Tran
TotalCost

2005
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

20066
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

20077
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

2008
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

2009
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
(*)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

20100
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

20111
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

Notes
(1) Efficiency Incremental Effect for residential, commercial, industrial and transportation
(2) Energy Efficiency Annual Effect for residential, commercial, industrial, transportation
(3) Life cycle efficiency savings (4) Direct efficiency cost by sector (5) Incentives efficiency
(6) Direct cost load management (7) Incentives load management (8) Indirect cost by sector
(*) yes: Direct and indirect efficiency cost are reported together as 'other'.
(**) yes: Total Cost was estimated as the sum of incentives and 'other' costs
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20122
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

2013
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes**
yes**
yes**
yes**
yes**

2014
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes**
yes**
yes**
yes**
yes**

2015
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes*
yes**
yes**
yes**
yes**
yes**

Table 22: Building Efficiency Revenue in US (million $)

Segment

2012

2013

2014

2015

Design Services

$3,128

$3,351

$3,850

$4,336

Building Envelope

$9,645

$11,919

$12,766

$14,127

HVAC

$11,532

$12,306

$13,184

$14,140

$925

$1,189

$850

$925

Water Heating

$1,197

$1,357

$1,490

$1,639

Lighting

$9,992

$10,701

$22,024

$24,666

$148

$208

$227

$472

Demand Response &
Enabling IT

$2,748

$2,748

$3,356

$3,431

Total

$39,315

$43,779

$57,747

$63,736

District Energy and CHP

Appliances and Electronic
Equipment

Note: Data captured from Advanced Energy Economy Market Report, prepared by
Navigant Research
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Figure 20: Residential Cost of Electricity - Northeast US
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Table 23: Variable Description – Covariates at DiD and SCM
ESRCD: Electricity price in the residential sector - Dollars per million Btu
GDPRX: Real gross domestic product. - Million chained (2009) dollars
TEGDS: Energy expenditures as percent of current-dollar GDP - Percent
TPOPP: Resident population including Armed Forces. - Thousand
WYTCB: Wind energy, total consumed. - Billion Btu
WYTXB: Wind energy, total end-use consumption. - Billion Btu
CDD: Cooling degree days
HDD: Heating degree days
PRC_1unit: Percentage of housing structures with one unit
PRC_20unit: Percentage of housing structures with 20 or more units
PRC_1bdrm: Percentage of housing with one bedroom
PRC_elche: Percentage of housing with electrical heating
PRC_occup: Percentage of Occupied housing units
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Table 24: Incremental electricity savings by state in Northeastern U.S. (2015)
State

Incremental
savings
(MWh)
222,822

Rhode Island
Massachusetts

% of 2015
retail sales
2.91

1,472,536

2.74

Vermont

110,642

2.01

Maine

183,347

1.53

Connecticut

435,740

1.48

1,559,665

1.05

904,238

0.64

64,869

0.59

409,957

0.55

New York
Pennsylvania
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Source: AEEE The 2016 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard
Table 25: Proved Reserves of Fossil Fuels

Year

Crude Oil
Billion (bbl)

Natural Gas
(Tcf)

1980

641.85

2,585.68

1985

701.49

3,401.25

1990

1,002.27

3,980.89

1995

1,000.62

4,981.45

2000

1,018.18

5,149.96

2005

1,278.45

6,044.93

2010

1,356.69

6,638.19

2015

1,657.95

6,950.51

Source: Author by utilizing time series data reported by the EIA U.S. Energy Information
Administration

140

Table 26: Mean Value Comparison of the Treated and Synthetic control output
RI Mean Annual Residential Electricity Consumption in MWh
Year

YRI Treated

YRI Synthetic

2005

7.4388719

7.428182

2006

7.0356641

7.0929316

2007

7.2916083

7.2541209

2008

7.0735087

7.1193668

2009

6.7963095

7.0001828

2010

7.2402263

7.3370818

2011

7.2368846

7.3503314

2012

7.1681738

7.2487761

2013

7.2220592

7.2473378

2014

6.9958849

7.1093024

2015

7.1230578

7.2184379

Table 27: State Weights in the synthetic Rhode Island
State
CT
MA
NH
NJ
NY
PA
VT

Weight
0
0
0
0.003
0.252
0.04
0.705
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Table 28: Residential electricity consumption predictor means before the LCP

Predictor

Treated

Synthetic

ln_price_elect
ln_income
ln_cdd
ln_hdd
prc_1unit
prc_20unt
prc_1bdrm
prc_elche
prc_occup
ln_kwh_consumer(2007)
ln_kwh_consumer(2006)
ln_kwh_consumer(2005)

3.71726
3.86127
6.39757
8.65696
0.55071
0.06901
0.14501
0.07069
0.00208
1.98672
1.95099
2.00672

3.71833
3.82305
5.83689
8.8787
0.59924
0.08007
0.13634
0.05159
0.00387
1.98205
1.96243
2.00728

Root Mean Squared Prediction Error (RMSPE) -> .0071665
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